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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on trade policy and factor mobility.
The first essay studies the effects of preferential tariff rates on China’s
imports from African Least Developed Countries (LDCs). On the second
ministerial meeting of China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) in 2003,
China offered duty-free treatment to 190 products originating from a group
of LDCs in Africa, so as to facilitate their entry into the Chinese market.
The goal of this essay is to examine whether or not this agreement has some
economic content. Based on detailed import data at the 6-digit harmonized
system level, we employ a triple-difference (DDD) approach to empirically
investigate the effects of preferential tariff rates on Chinese imports from
African LDCs. The estimation results show that, on average, there is no
evidence that duty free access helped African LDCs effectively gain access
to the Chinese market in the years following the initial implementation of
this policy. However, we do find that there is an increase of imports in the
last year of our sample, suggesting that the impact is growing over time. We
also find that agricultural goods experience the largest increase in import
values, while imports of textile goods are still relative low.
The second essay investigates the impact on China’s economic growth
of the State-Sponsored Study Abroad Programmes (SSSAP). It is widely
believed that human capital has played a crucial role in the Chinese eco-
nomic miracle. In recent years, the Chinese government has launched a
series of SSSAP as to further improve domestic human capital through for-
eign training. In this essay, we explore the effects of such programs on
China’s economic growth in a Lucas-type endogenous growth model with
human capital accumulation. We first derive the growth-maximizing tax
rate on output which is used to finance public spending on education. Next,
we determine the optimal share of educational expenditure between home-
educated and foreign-educated human capital, taking tax rate on output as
given. Due to the complexity of the model, we also carry out a series of
numerical simulations to examine the effect of SSSAP on Chinese economic
growth.
In the third essay, we study the European citizens’ preferences concerning
the allocation of power between European Union (EU) and Member States
in the domain of immigration policy. We first develop a simple framework to
show that (i) harmonization of immigration policies is likely to lead to a more
liberal immigration policy; (ii) there exists a strong relationship between EU
citizens’ education levels and their supports for delegating competences to
the EU institutions in the field of immigration. Using several rounds of
Eurobarometer surveys carried out between 2000 and 2008, we test the the-
oretical predictions, and find that on average education level has a positive,
statistically significant impact on natives’ preferences over a common immi-
gration policy. In addition, we find that self-reported political orientation
and overall perception of the European Union also affect natives’ attitudes
towards the harmonization of immigration policy.
Acknowledgements
It is my pleasure to thank those who have made this thesis possible and
have helped me during my doctoral program.
First and foremost, I would like to express my gratefulness to my su-
pervisor, Prof. Giovanni Facchini, for his invaluable supervision during the
whole Ph.D. program. His excellent guidance, invaluable advices, helpful
comments, and continuous encouragement make this research achieved. This
work would never be possible without his help. I am grateful to him partic-
ularly for his guidance concerning how to approach and analyze a research
question, and for his endless patience to suffer through many drafts of my
dissertation.
I am sincerely thankful for the opportunity to purse a Ph.D. degree
in Economics at Universita degli Studi di Milano. I owe many thanks to
the faculty for making my time as a graduate student such a rewarding
experience. My special thanks are given to Prof. Franco Donzelli and Prof.
Michele Santoni for their endless help during my stay in Milan. I am also
grateful to my colleagues who endured this long process with me, always
offering support and help.
Many thanks to the Department of Economics at Erasmus University
Rotterdam for having me as a visiting Ph.D. student. It is a great opportu-
nity to enrich my experience. I am very fortunate to find a welcoming and
inspiring atmosphere there. I deeply thank the staff and students for their
hospitality. In particular, I would like to thank Prof. Yvonne Adema for
discussing with me and lending me her precious book.
I am also sincerely thankful to Prof. Rui Zhao from University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign. Many thanks to her for giving me valuable advices
when I was in Champaign, United State.
Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Gang Yao, and my parents,
for their love and endless support to me throughout my academic journey.
I love you more than words could ever express.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The Initial Impact of Preferential Access to China’s Market
under the Addis Ababa Action Plan 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 SSSAP and Economic Growth in China 41
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.1 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 The household sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.3 Production of human capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.4 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Balanced Growth Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5 Growth-Maximizing Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5.1 Optimal tax rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5.2 Optimal allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
i
CONTENTS
3.6 Numerical Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4 Individual Attitudes towards Europeanization of Immigra-
tion Policy 69
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.1 Centralization of immigration policy . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.2 Individual attitudes towards centralization . . . . . . 79
4.4 Data and Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5 Benchmark Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.6 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
ii
List of Figures
2.1 Chinese average imports from African LDCs . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Recruitment of state sponsored study programme from 1996-
2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 The distribution of scholarships across programmes in 2008 . 62
3.3 Growth rate against tax rate: fixed allocation of education
expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Growth path of consumption to physical capital ratio . . . . . 64
3.5 Growth path of physical to foreign-educated capital ratio . . 65
3.6 Growth path of home-educated to foreign-educated capital ratio 66
3.7 Growth rate against allocation: fixed total education expen-
diture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1 Relationship between human capital and changes in income . 96
4.2 Fraction of favoring an EU immigration policy over 2000-08
(EU-15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Fraction of favoring an EU immigration policy over 2004-08
(NMS-10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4 Individuals’ attitudes to an EU immigration policy over time 99
iii
List of Tables
2.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 DDD Estimate of Impact of Tariff-Free on Chinese Imports . 28
2.3 Estimation Results for the Benchmark Specification . . . . . 29
2.4 Timing of the Treatment Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5 Treatment Effects across Sub-Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1 Summary statistics of individual-level variables . . . . . . . . 100
4.2 Summary statistics of individual-level variables by country
(mean values) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3 Determinants of Attitudes towards an EU Immigration Policy
(EU-15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.4 Determinants of Attitudes towards Common Immigration Pol-
icy (EU15 + NMS10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5 Determinants of attitudes to common immi policy in each
country (EU-15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.6 Determinants of attitudes to common immi policy in each
country (EU-15) continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
v
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis contains three self-contained essays. The first essay explores the
impact of preferential tariff rates on China’s imports from African Least De-
veloped Countries. The Second essay presents a simple endogenous growth
model with two types of human capital to investigate China’s State-Sponsored
Study Abroad Programs. While the third essay offers a simple framework
for individuals’ attitudes towards the Europeanization of immigration policy
and empirically examines the role played by education in shaping individu-
als’ attitudes. In the remainder of this section, I will give a brief overview
of the essays included in this thesis.
The first chapter, entitled “The Initial Impact of Preferential Access to
China’s Market under the Addis Ababa Action Plan”, evaluates the effects
of preferential tariff rates on China’s imports from the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) in Africa. At the second ministerial meeting of the China-
Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) in 2003, the Addis Ababa Action Plan
(2004-06) (hereafter AAAP) was concluded. One of the major concrete
measures that China promised to undertake is granting tariff-free treatment
for 190 products from 28 African LCDs who have developed diplomatic
relations with China. Furthermore, in 2006, during the FOCAC Summit
and the third Ministerial Conference, China extended zero-tariff treatment
to more than 440 products from 30 African LDCs. Are these preferences
merely a talking point for Chinese and African officials, or do they have
1
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some economic content?
Based on detailed import data at the 6-digit harmonized system level,
we employ a triple-difference (DDD) approach to empirically investigate the
effects of preferential tariff rates on Chinese imports from African LDCs.
The estimation results show that, on average, there is no evidence that duty
free access helped African LDCs effectively gain access to the Chinese mar-
ket in the years following the initial implementation of this policy. However,
we do find that there is an increase of imports in the last year of our sample,
suggesting that the impact is growing over time. We also find that agricul-
tural goods experience the largest increase in import values, while imports
of textile goods are still relative low. These results imply, on one hand, a
longer period is required for firms in African LDCs to take advantage of
the free access to Chinese markets; on the other hand, Chinese government
should include more imports-sensitive products into the preference list to
make the agreement effective.
The second chapter, entitled “SSSAP and Economic Growth in China”,
investigates the impact of State-Sponsored Study Abroad Programmes (here-
after SSSAP) on Chinese economic growth. It is widely believed that human
capital has played a crucial role in the Chinese economic miracle. In recent
years, the Chinese government has launched a series of SSSAP as to fur-
ther improve domestic human capital through foreign training. The SSSAP
are designed to select and support high-level personnel to pursue higher
education in foreign universities, mainly in Western developed countries.
The recruitment numbers have been growing very rapidly, from 2044 stu-
dents/scholars in 1996 to nearly 13,000 in 2008. Even if as of today the
personnel enrolled in the programs account for only a small portion of the
highly educated population in China, the effects of such programs are likely
not to be negligible. Meanwhile, the SSSAP will have an impact on the in-
vestment in domestic higher education given the limited availability of fiscal
funds for education. Therefore, what is the optimal allocation of investment
among home- and foreign-educated human capital?
We investigate the SSSAP in a Lucas-type endogenous growth model
2
with human capital accumulation. We find that the growth-maximizing
tax rate on output, which is used to finance public spending on education,
should be set to the elasticity of output with respect to human capital. We
also find that the growth-maximizing allocation of educational expenditure
is determined by the elasticity of final output with respect to human capital,
the relative cost of foreign-educated human capital, as well as the elasticity
of human capital output to government spending in education. In addition,
we carry out a series of numerical simulations to examine the effects of
SSSAP on Chinese economic performance.
The third paper, entitled “Individual Attitudes towards Europeanization
of Immigration Policy”, explores the relationship between EU citizen’s edu-
cation levels and their attitudes towards the Europeanization of immigration
policy. Although the EU has been working to build a common immigration
policy ever since the early 1990s, an EU common immigration policy does
not existed yet. Member states are reluctant to delegate powers to suprana-
tional institutions, particularly concerning legal labor migration, by acting
outside of the supranational organizations or by including provisions in the
treaties. So, what lies at the heart of this kind of reluctance? Do government
policies largely reflect the preferences of voters?
In this paper we study the European citizens’ preferences concerning
the allocation of power between EU and member states in the domain of
immigration policy. We first develop a simple framework to show that (i)
harmonization of immigration policies is likely to lead to a more liberal
immigration policy; (ii) there exists a strong relationship between natives’
education levels and their supports for delegating competences to EU insti-
tutions in the field of immigration. We then test the theoretical predictions,
using several rounds of Eurobarometer surveys carried out between 2000
and 2008. We find that, on average, education level has a positive, statisti-
cally significant impact on individual’s preference over the centralization of
immigration policy.
3
Chapter 2
The Initial Impact of
Preferential Access to
China’s Market under the
Addis Ababa Action Plan
2.1 Introduction
Over the last ten years, cooperation between China and African countries
has received a lot of attention in the international media. In 2000, the
China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) was launched as a mechanism
for collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and a
number of African countries, concentrating on issues of economic and so-
cial development. This forum marked a substantive change of emphasis in
China’s foreign policy toward Africa, from donor funding to economically
viable and sustainable projects. The cooperation reached a new level in 2006
when the third ministerial meeting of FOCAC was held in Beijing. During
that forum, the Chinese president Hu Jingtao announced the adoption of
eight important measures to foster growth among the least developed coun-
tries (LDCs) of Africa, including the cancelation of $US1.3 billion worth of
foreign debt, the provision of loans on preferential terms, and the grant-
5
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ing of duty-free market access for some of the commodities from the least
developed countries in Africa.
Chinese statistics show that such tariff-free access is yielding remark-
able results. In 2005, under the preferential arrangement, China imported
products worth a total of US$380 millions from Africa, up 88% on a year-
on-year basis. In the first half of 2006, the value of such imports from Africa
reached US$250 million, a year-on-year growth of 57%. These numbers show
that preferential access to the Chinese market might actually have played a
positive role in promoting the growth of Africa’s exports into China.
However, it may be too simplistic to attribute this surge in trade volumes
entirely to the implementation of preferential access. The surge in imports
of such products from LDCs in Africa might result from other factors, such
as an overall boost in the exporter’s economy, China’s increasing demand
and other related foreign trade policies. In fact, we do not expect large
effects from this agreement since the preferential access offered by China to
African LDCs is rather limited in terms of depth and coverage, compared
to the preferences offered by developed countries to most African countries,
which covers up to 95% of all the imported products. Furthermore, the
overall share of African LDCs’ exports going to China continues to be small,
relative to the US and the EU, which also makes the impact of preferential
access limited.
Therefore, a more precise analysis is required to examine the effect of this
preferential arrangement on Chinese imports from African LDCs involved
in the arrangement. We employ a triple-difference (or DDD) approach, to
take advantage of the fact that the tariff-free policy is exclusively offered to
190 products from 28 African LDCs. With the triple difference specification,
the effect of preferential access can be effectively isolated from the overall
change for tariff-free products and overall change in countries evolved in the
preferential agreement. The estimation results show that, on average, the
preferential tariff rates do not have a strong impact on Chinese imports from
LDCs in Africa.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
6
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an overview of the evolution of Sino-African relations, and in particular of
Chinese imports falling under the preferential arrangement. Section III re-
views the relevant literature evaluating existing trade preferences offered to
African countries. Section IV introduces the methodology of DDD estima-
tion in detail. Section V describes the data whereas the results are presented
in Section VI. Section VII concludes.
2.2 Background
Trade preferences for African countries have been granted, in various forms,
by almost all developed countries, but with mixed results. The two most
important preference schemes for African LDCs are the US African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the EU Everything But Arms (EBA)
Initiative. AGOA provides preferential access to over 6,400 products, and
applies to 38 African countries, some of which are LDCs and some are not.1
The EBA preference applies to all LDCs worldwide, covering 10,200 prod-
ucts. Just as suggested by its name, the EBA agreement provides zero-tariff
for everything except armament. Only three products have not been lib-
eralized immediately: bananas, rice and sugar, and their phase-in periods
for full market access were January 2006, September 2009 and July 2009,
respectively.2
Recently, some developing countries, such as China and India, have also
joined this move to open their market for products from LDCs. The duty-
free access to China’s market for some commodities from African LDCs is
an example of this type of policy. At the second ministerial meeting of the
China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC), the Addis Ababa Action Plan
1As of 2000, when AGOA originally came into effect, the initiative applied only
to 34 African countries. Since then, 8 countries have been added and 4 have been
removed from Washington’s eligibility list. The list of eligible products is also
subject to changes at the US president’s behest.
2The EBA is scarcely utilized by African LDCs. Primarily this is because quali-
fying countries prefer the more familiar, and in some respects superior, preferences
provided by the long-standing Lome´ Convention and the successor Cotonou agree-
ment. The true test for EBA may occur in later years when it will become the only
EU preference package available to some African LDCs.
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(2004-06) (hereafter AAAP) was concluded. One of the major concrete
measures that China promised to undertake is granting tariff-free treatment
for 190 products from 28 African LCDs who have developed diplomatic
relations with China. In January 2005, Beijing officially published the list
of designated products and countries. Furthermore, in 2006, during the
FOCAC Summit and the third Ministerial Conference, China extended zero-
tariff treatment to more than 440 products from 30 African LDCs. The
zero-tariff treatment of the newly-added 254 lines came into force on July
1st, 2007.
One factor making trade preferences potentially important is the rapidly
increasing Chinese imports from African LDCs. As a destination country for
African exports, China is still relatively small compared with the US and the
EU. However, nine of the thirty countries which have received preferential
treatment list China as the second biggest export destination. And five
countries, i.e. Benin, Mali, Somalia, Sudan and Zambia indicate China
as their most important export market. Only one country in the group –
Chad – reports no trade with China yet. Using a simple “implicit transfer”
calculation3, the overall economic value of these preferences is in the order
of $10.3 million per year.
Another factor which might increase the effectiveness of the preferences
is that they are well tailored to the African LDCs’ export capacity. The
most economically valuable Chinese preferences involve primary products,
including sesamum seeds, cocoa beans, various leathers, copper and cobalt
minerals. The average margin of the original 190 tariff lines is 9.8%, and up
to 10.9% in the case of the newly-added 254 lines, which means non-eligible
China’s MFN trade partners face an average MFN tariff rate of 9.8 or 10.9,
3The implicit transfer of tariff revenue due to the preference scheme is derived
from the value of exports for which preference is actually requested (here, the
average annual export value from 2002 to 2006) multiplied by the preference margin.
In reality, this ‘transfer’ will not necessarily accrue to the exporter, but is only a
crude approximation of the value of a preference. Furthermore, the true value
will depend upon the price elasticity of demand and supply for these products
in granting countries and beneficiaries. The implicit transfer is presented only to
provide an indication for the true preference value.
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whereas eligible African LDCs face zero.4 This is a significant margin of
preference, considering the benefiting countries already exported most of
these products to China prior to special treatment.
Considering the remaining 49 products on the duty-free list currently
not exported from African LDCs to China, these may provide additional
economic benefits, if the margin of preference is significant and supply con-
straints are not too great. Most of such products are textiles, yarn and
thread. These are potentially of great interest for African LDCs and repre-
sent higher value-added opportunities to export goods if these countries can
cost-efficiently transform their silk, cotton and wool. The average margin of
preference for these products is 9.4%, which does offer the African countries
a real advantage over China’s MFN trade partners.
However, there are still lots of important products which are excluded
from these preferences. The most important omission is raw cotton (uncar-
ded, uncombed), a vital export for many African LDCs, which faces a tariff
as high as 40% in China. Products subject to import quotas, such as sugar
and seeds oil, and products which are import sensitive, typically Aluminum
oxide, are also excluded from the list. The extension of preferences in this
area could lead to significant results, and these are the sectors in which
China and African countries should work on in the future.
2.3 Literature Review
There is a substantial body of literature on measuring the effect of prefer-
ential market access granted to African LDCs and other African countries,
but the conclusions reached vary substantially across different studies. The
existing literature can broadly be divided into two branches, that is, ex-
ante computable-general-equilibrium (CGE) simulation studies and ex-post
empirical analyses. The ex-post empirical work is particularly extensive,
drawing either on aggregate-level data or disaggregated commodity level
4By margin of preference we mean the percentage by which particular imports
from one country are subject to lower tariff than the MFN rate; the higher the
MFN tariff, the bigger the margin of preference.
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data.
In particular, much empirical work has been devoted towards evaluating
the trade and welfare effects of trade preferences for LDCs in Africa. One
typical example is Hoekman et al (2002), which studies the potential effects
of the removal of tariffs on peak items (with tariff above 15 percent) in the
United States, Japan, Europe and Canada on exports from LDCs.5 Using
a simple partial equilibrium model of the world market for each ‘product’
- defined as a 6-digit tariff line item, the authors find that giving least
developed countries full duty- and quota-free access to the US, EU, Canada
and Japan for peak-tariff products, would increase their total annual exports
by 11 percent - or roughly $2.5 billion.
Frazer & Van Biesebroeck (2007) provides an in-depth examination of
the impact of AGOA on US imports from African countries. Based on 6-
digit level imports data, they find that AGOA has generated a large and
robust impact on apparel imports into the United States, as well as on the
agricultural and manufactured products covered by the agreement. They
also find that these import responses grew over time and were particularlly
the largest in product categories where the tariffs removed were large. Fur-
thermore, they find AGOA did not lead to a decrease in exports to Europe
in these product categories, suggesting that the increase in AGOA exports
is a result of trade creation rather than trade diversion.
A few researches have devoted their attention to the effects of liberal-
ization among south countries. For example, Mayda & Steinberg (2008)
explore the static effects of South-South preferential trade agreements stem-
ming from changes in trade patterns. Specifically, they estimate the impact
of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) on
Uganda’s imports between 1994 and 2003, based on detailed import and
tariff data at the 6-digit harmonized system level. Using a difference-in-
difference estimation strategy, they find that, in contrast to evidence from
aggregate statistics, COMESA’s preferential tariff liberalization has not con-
5Such “tariff peaks” are often concentrated in products developing countries
want to export: agricultural and food products and products from labor intensive
sectors such as apparel and footwear.
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siderably increased Uganda’s trade with member countries.
However, so far the effects of the preferential access offered by China to
African LDCs have not been the subject of close scrutiny. To the best of
my knowledge, Minson (2007) is the only contribution on this topic. The
author briefly examines the importance of the eligible 454 products for the
African LDCs, and he concludes that it is very difficult to claim that the Chi-
nese preference programme will have a dramatic impact in these economies.
However, no precise estimation of the effect is provided in Minson (2007). In
this paper, we try to fill this gap by performing a triple-difference estimation
which is a widely-used measure in policy evaluation. From a methodological
viewpoint, the analysis carried out in our paper is closely related to Frazer
& Van Biesebroeck (2007).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
Any of the existing standard trade models predict that preferential tariff
will induce eligible countries to increase their exports of eligible products
which were already exporting, or start exporting eligible products which
might become competitive because of the elimination of tariffs. Therefore,
no formal model is presented in this paper.
The fact that unilateral tariff elimination is granted to a number of
products from some African LDCs allows us to apply a triple difference
identification strategy to estimate the effects on trade flows. The triple dif-
ference estimate, popular in evaluating policy changes, is an extension of
the conventional difference-in-differences (DD) estimate. The DDD estima-
tion controls for treatment-independent trends in a more robust way, and
requires weaker assumptions than DD approach.
The intuition of DDD approach is straightforward, and can be best be
seen when only two years are considered, one year prior to treatment, say
2004, and a second year when the treatment is in effect, say 2006. Let
lnIMP be the log of (one plus) imports values, with superscripts standing
for treated or control group while subscripts indicating before or after the
treatment. The triple difference used to measure the effect of the AAAP
11
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tariff-free program is given by:
DDD = ((lnIMP T06 − lnIMP
T
04)− (lnIMP
C
06 − lnIMP
C
04))︸ ︷︷ ︸
AAAPCountry−DD
− ((lnIMP T06 − lnIMP
T
04)− (lnIMP
C
06 − lnIMP
C
04))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non−AAAPCountry−DD
(2.4.1)
The first DD term gives the effect of tariff preferences on exports of eli-
gible products within an designated country, by assuming that AAAP prod-
ucts and non-APPP products would experience a parallel export growth
pattern in absence of policy intervention. And the second term gives the
equivalent DD in non-designated country. Thus, the value of triple-difference
isolates the “pure” effects of AAAP. Namely, the triple-difference estimation
can identify whether AAAP disproportionately increases imports of eligible
products from African LDCs compared to increases in imports of ineligible
products from designated African LDCs, and also compared to the rela-
tive increases in imports of eligible to ineligible products from non-involved
countries.
The simplest way of expressing the triple difference in equation (2.1) in
regression form is to regress imports on three dummy variables: one for each
difference (Ineffectt, Countryc, and Productp), as well as the three double
interactions of these variables and the single triple interaction term.
lnIMPcpt = α1 + β1(Ineffectt ∗ Countryc ∗ Productp) +
α2(Ineffectt ∗ Productp) +
α3(Ineffectt ∗ Countryc) +
α4(Countryc ∗ Productp) +
α5Ineffectt + α6Countryc + α7Productp + ǫcpt(2.4.2)
where p indexes a product, c indexes a country, and t indexes time. The
left-hand side is the log of the value of imports into China of product p from
country c at time t, as reported by China. The variable Ineffectt is defined
as a dummy switching from zero to one, for all countries and products, in
12
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year 2005, when the preferential tariff rates came into force. The variable
Countryc is a time-invariant dummy equal to one for those African LDCs
and zero otherwise. Similarly, Productp is a dichotomous variable taking
the value of one for products eligible for duty-free import under the AAAP.
The specification above is the simplest but most restrictive one. It does
not allow for much country- or product-level heterogeneity in the base-level
of imports into China. All country-product combinations are lumped into
four exclusive groups: eligible products from designated countries, ineligi-
ble products from designated countries, eligible products from non-involved
countries, ineligible products from non-involved countries. Each group is
restricted to have a single base level of imports. Additionally, it assumes
that the increase in China’s imports was the same for all eligible products
and for all designated countries.
In order to relax these assumptions, Frazer & Van Biesebroeck (2007) in
their paper employ an entirely unrestrictive specification:
lnIMPcpt = β1Ineffectt ∗ Countryc ∗ Productp
+country/productcp + country/yearct + product/yearpt + ǫcpt(2.4.3)
where, all the single dummies and double interaction terms are replaced
with three sets of interactive fixed effects, which allow for heterogeneity
in (i) the base level imports of a specific product from a specific country
(country/productcp), (ii) the overall imports from a given country in a given
year (country/yearct); (iii) the overall imports of a particular product in a
given year (product/yearpt). The only coefficient in this specification, β1,
measures the average treatment effect of tariff exemption of eligible products
for designated countries over the years after implementation.
However, given the large number of products, creating and storing these
interactive dummies requires computer memory space which is prohibitively
high for many researchers. Therefore, we instead resort to a less unrestrictive
13
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specification given by:
lnIMPcpt = β1(Ineffectt ∗ Countryc ∗ Productp) +
α2(Ineffectt ∗ Productp) +
α3(Ineffectt ∗ Countryc) +
country/productcp + yeart + ǫcpt (2.4.4)
Our primary interest is still on the coefficient, β1, of the triple interac-
tion term, Ineffectt ∗Countryc ∗Productp, which estimates the impacts of
trade liberalization under AAAP on imports from African LDCs into China.
The double interaction term, Ineffectt ∗Productp, control for import vari-
ations of eligible products irrespective of their origins after the preferen-
tial arrangement is implemented, while the other double interaction term,
Ineffectt ∗Countryc, controls for variations in imports by China from des-
ignated LDCs in Africa, irrespective of their products, after the entry into
force of the preferential arrangement. This specification allows for hetero-
geneity in the base level of imports of a specific product from a specific
country, and also heterogeneity in those products in each period, due to a
full set of product-country interactive dummies, country/productcp, and a
full set of year dummies, yeart.
An extension of the benchmark model is to consider different treatments
for sub-category products. Let Ω = {A,M,T,O} be the set of these cat-
egories, whose elements respectively represent agricultural products, min-
eral products, textiles goods and others. We use four product dummies,
Productkj(k ∈ Ω), to investigate the heterogenous treatments of eligible
products. The modified specification is given by
lnIMPcpt =
∑
k∈Ω
β1k(Ineffectt ∗ Countryc ∗ Productkp) +
∑
k∈Ω
α2k(Ineffectt ∗ Productkp) +
α3(Ineffectt ∗ Countryc) +
country/productcp + yeart + ǫcpt (2.4.5)
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where the coefficients, β1k, capture the category-specific impact of elimina-
tion of tariff on China’s imports from designated African LDCs.
Another variation on the benchmark specification is designed to distin-
guish the import response at the intensive margin - i.e. whether we observe
increased exports, and at the extensive margin - whether a given sector is
starting to export. It is very likely that the African LDCs start to export
a range of products facing duty-free market access. But it is unlikely that
these two effects are of the same magnitude, which is implicitly assumed
in the benchmark specification. To deal with this concern, we use a linear
probability model to isolate the extensive margin response, which is feasible
since we also include the zero trade values.6 The right-hand side of specifi-
cation (2.4) remains unchanged, while the dependent variable is replaced by
a binary variable that takes the value of one if the trade record is positive
and zero otherwise.
2.5 Data Description
We use commodity-level import data reported by China at the 6-digit Har-
monized System level (HS 2002), since some LDCs in Africa report trade
data only sporadically. More precisely, import data are taken from the
COMTRADE database developed by the United Nations Statistics Divi-
sion.
Out of consideration for “similarity requirement between treated and
control groups” in DDD estimation, we restrict our sample to developing
countries except for Asian LDCs since they also enjoy free access into the
Chinese market for the original 190 products since 2005.7 For the same
reason, we limit our sample to 4-digit level products which have underlying
6-digit level products involved in AAAP preferential tariff arrangement. For
6We choose linear probability model over probit model, because 1) the main
disadvantage - predicted values are not restricted to lie on the (0, 1) interval - is
unlikely to be much of an issue as all coefficients are identified off the time variation
within country-product categories; 2) the probit model usually produce a biased
estimates in DDD estimation, and the interactive term is difficult to be interpreted
in DDD estimation.
7the definition of developing countries come from World Bank.
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example, since the tariff of item, 010639, has been reduced to zero, the
corresponding 4-digit category, 0106, is kept in the sample. On the opposite,
if none of the 6-digit sub-categories has been involved in the preferential
arrangement, the whole 4-digit category will be excluded from our sample.
The number of the remaining sample is 244,081.
Due to data availability, we use the COMTRADE data and work at the
HS 6-digit level of aggregation, even if the Act defines products benefitting
from preferential treatment under AAAP at HS 8-digit level. Consequently,
the Productp variable in the regression is not a dummy, but varies continu-
ously between 0 and 1. It is constructed to represent for each 6-digit product
the fraction of underlying 8-digit products (by value) that are eligible for
duty-free imports. However, we also constructed a binary variable which
equals to one if there is at least one underlying 8-digit product is eligible for
duty-free imports and zero otherwise, in order to get an overall view of the
data set. This binary variable will not substantially bias our results since
the item liberalized is exactly the main item or the unique item for which
China has positive imports.
If nothing is reported in the original data set, imports are set to zero in
our sample, assuming the missing values are randomly distributed across all
observations. Based on this assumption, we follow a very simple procedure
to deal with the zeros, i.e. adding one unit (dollar) to all import values
before taking logarithms.8 Thus, the dependent variable for most of the
analysis is the log of one plus (value of) import of a particular product from
each country in the developing world, except Asian LDCs, in each year from
2002 to 2007.
The full list of eligible products and designated countries is published on
the website of the Ministry of Commerce.9 Details of the products can be
8Frankel (1997) discusses several approaches that have been most commonly
taken to deal with zero-valued entries (Frankel 1997, Chap. 6).
9The list is available at
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bb/200501/20050100335965.html.
The 28 countries on the list are: Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.
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seen in Appendix I, including product descriptions and the corresponding
preferential and Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rates at the 8-digit level.
In an effort to capture different treatment effects for sub-category products,
we divide the 190 eligible products into four sub-categories: agriculture,
(Chap 1-24 under HS 2002, 40 products in total), minerals and base metals
(Chap 72-83, 19 products), textiles (Chap 50-65, 38 products) and others
(93 products).
There is another issue worth noting. The latest trade data accessible
are for 2007, which prevents us from examining the long-term treatment
effect. This short treatment window has the benefit of cleaner identification
because few other changes can take place; however, on the other hand, it
may bias the estimate since a longer period is required for firms to fully
exploit the newly obtained market access.
Table 2.1 represents the summary statistics of the dependent and control
variables included in the DDD estimation. Figure 2.1 gives Chinese average
imports values for each of the four groups: eligible products in designated
countries, non-eligible products in designated countries, eligible products
in non-designated countries, and non-eligible products in non-designated
countries. From Figure 2.1, we can see that Chinese imports of eligible
products from designated Africa LDCs did not immediately surge in year
2005 when the free access came into force, but it kept growing in the following
years after the implementation.
2.6 Estimation Results
After describing the model and the data used, we now turn to the estimation
of the trade effects. First of all, we use Table 2.2 to illustrate the DDD
estimation of the effect of elimination of tariff rates on Chinese imports
from African LDCs. The top panel compares the change in imports for the
eligible products to the change in imports for the non-eligible products in
treatment countries. Each cell contains the average log of imports value
for the group labeled on the axes, along with the standard error and the
number of observations. There is a 11.1-percent increase in the import
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value of eligible products over this period, compared to a 3.6-percent rise
for non-eligible products. Thus, there is a 7.5-percent relative increase in
the import values of products in countries which are granted a zero tariff
rate.
The same exercise is performed for the control group, all the developing
countries not involved in AAAP tariff-free preferences, in the bottom panel
of Table 2.2. For this group, we find a 9.2-percent relative rise in import
values. Taking the difference between the two panels of Table 2.2, we get
the DDD estimate. Although not statistically significant, this negative DDD
estimate roughly shows that the preferential tariff rates do not effectively
help Africa LDCs export their products more to China.
The results for benchmark regression (2.4) with a full set of country-
product and year fixed effects, estimated on the whole sample, are in col-
umn (1) of Table 2.3. The coefficient β1 on the triple-interaction term,
Ineffectt ∗ Countryc ∗ Productp, identifies the impact of tariff elimina-
tion on China’s imports of AAAP-eligible products from LDCs in Africa.
The negative point estimate indicates that, on average, the Chinese imports
from Africa LDCs marginally decreased (a fall of 0.6 percent) in the years
following the implementation. This might be driven by the fact that the
coverage of preferential tariff is quite limited, and the goods covered under
the agreement are not the goods that African LDCs are capable of export-
ing. Furthermore, a longer period after the introduction of the agreement
might be needed for firms to fully exploit the newly obtained market access.
For the purpose of comparison, the results for DD estimation are also pre-
sented in column (2) and (3) of Table 2.3. We find that the DDD approach
address the “endogeneity of policy” critique of standard DD estimation if
either a country or a products-level analysis was performed separately. In
column (2), the sample is restricted to twenty-five LDCs in Africa who are
involved in the AAAP framework. The coefficient on the double-interaction
term, Ineffectt ∗ Productp, captures the impact of concessions solely on
the relative import growth of eligible and non-eligible products. We include
additive country and year dummies, rather than double-interactive fixed ef-
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fects as in the DDD specification, to allow for unobservable heterogeneities.
In column (2), we find that there is a 9.1% relative rise in Chinese imports
of eligible products from these twenty-five LDCs in Africa. The treatment
effect is overestimated, and an DDD estimation suggests that such an in-
crease could be driven by Chinese overall demand for these eligible products
regardless of their origin.
The DD estimate can also be implemented by limiting the sample to
the 190 products from all countries in the sample. In this way, the 25
African LDCs is the treated group, while the rest are considered as control
group. Similarly, the coefficient on the double-interaction term, Ineffectt ∗
Countryc, represents the difference between the export growth on these
products in African LDCs and other developing countries. The effect in
column (3) is underestimated at -6.5%, since the estimate fails to take into
account the overall drop in China’s imports from designated African LDC
countries compared to other countries, for all products, or for all non-eligible
products more precisely.
And in column (4), we report the estimate of the effects of free market
access on the probability that an eligible country exports a product to China.
The estimate shows that such probability on average has slightly decreased
by 0.4%, during the period 2005-2007. Under the preferential arrangement,
it is possible for designated countries to increase the volume of products
they already exported, however, it is more difficult for them to create new
exports in a short time.
The results of Table 2.3 are the average treatment effects for all the el-
igible products and countries in all the years following the implementation
of the agreement. We can examine the timing of the effect by interacting
the triple interaction term with year dummies for each of the post-treatment
years. As in the benchmark specification, a full set of country-product inter-
active dummies and year dummies are included as controls. Both the effects
on trade values and probability of starting to export are reported in Table
2.4.
The results in column (1) of Table 2.4 show that the impact of free
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access grows over time, but until 2007 it did not play a role in encouraging
Chinese imports of eligible products from African LDCs. We expect the
preferential arrangement to have a larger impact in the following years as
more and more firms get familiar with and take advantage of the free access
to Chinese markets. We do not find an evidence that tariff-free agreement
helped African LDCs starting export new products whose export values are
zero prior to the introduction of the agreement. However, we observe that
the negative coefficient becomes much smaller in year 2007, suggesting the
preferential tariff might have a positive effect on probability of exporting in
the near future.
To this point, we have implicitly assumed that the impact of the tariff
elimination is the same across all eligible products. In reality, they might
differ from each other since they will be affected by different demand- and
supply-side factors. Allowing heterogeneous treatment effects for these sub-
categories simply requires replacing the dummy variable, Productp, with
four dummies, Productkj(k ∈ Ω), where Ω is the set of four products sub-
category. As in the benchmark specification, a full set of country/year inter-
active fixed effects, as well as year fixed effects, are included in this modified
specification.
The estimation results of specification (2.5) are reported in Table 2.5,
which presents the different effects of trade liberalization on sub-categories
of products under the zero-tariff agreement. Results in column (1) show that
there is a 15.8-perent relative fall in textiles goods, which is not surprising
since the African LDCs do not have a comparative advantage in textiles
goods. On the other hand, the agricultural products experience a 14.2-
percent relative increase. For mineral products and all other products, we
only see a marginal relative rise, 2.2-percent and 1.7-percent, respectively.
Compared to the impact on trade values, the effect on the probability
of exporting new products is relatively small, as shown in column (2) of
Table 2.5. There is a relative rise, 0.98-percent and 0.6-pencet, respectively
for agricultural and mineral goods. On the other hand, a relative decrease,
1.7-percent and 0.4-percent, is observed respectively in the probability of
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importing textiles and other goods. These results are consistent with the
general pattern of Chinese imports.
In sum, we find that the preferential tariff rates under the AAAP frame-
work neither substantially increase China’s imports of eligible products from
African LDCs, except in year 2007, nor they increase the probability of im-
porting. In terms of products sub-category, we find that agricultural goods
enjoy the largest gains from free access to Chinese market, whereas imports
of textile goods remain relatively low.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper has carried out what is – to the best of our knowledge – the
first systematic analysis of the impact of the Addis Ababa Action Plan on
China’s imports from African LDC countries. As a a result of the AAAP,
190 products have gained duty free access in China in 2005, whereas the
same status has been reached by a total of 454 products three years later.
Our analysis has focused on the original 190 items because of the lack of
more recent trade data. To isolate the treatment effect directly tied to the
preferences from export growth in non-eligible products or in non-designated
countries, we have implemented a triple-difference (DDD) approach. The
DDD approach can effectively address the “endogeniety of policy” problem
in standard DD method, and correct the biases in the DD estimates which
would result from focusing only on eligible products or only in designated
countries.
The estimation result of the benchmark model shows that there is no
evidence that the elimination of tariff has a strong, positive effect on exports
of eligible products from designated African LDCs into China and on the
probability of starting export new products. More specifically, there is a
relative fall, by 0.6-percent and 0.4-percent, respectively, for absolute trade
values and probability of exporting new products.
In the benchmark specification of DDD estimate, it is implicitly assumed
that the treatment effect is the same cross all eligible products over the
years following its implementation. We relax this assumption, by checking
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the effects over time and cross sub-categories. We did not find a positive
impact neither on absolute trade valuer nor on the probability of exporting
in year 2005 and 2006. However, in year 2007, there is a relative increase,
by 3.2-percent, in Chinese imports of eligible products from eligible African
LDCs. As for the effects cross sub-categories, we found relative rises for all
the products except for textile goods.
It is worth mentioning that there are still many products that are ex-
cluded from these preferences. The most important omission is raw cotton
(uncarded, uncombed), a vital export for many African LDCs, which faces a
40% tariff in China. However, it is unlikely to be included in the preference
in very near term. Realistically, China is much more likely to offer prefer-
ences on products less sensitive than cotton, for example products with an
MFN tariff below 20%. The inclusion of such kind of products will effectively
promote China’s imports from African LDCs.
As a final point, another issue deserving consideration is China has made
a vast investment on road, rail networks and some other sectors on the
continent, with billions of dollars committed to finance these projects. If the
massive project finance would succeed, the value of Chinese trade preferences
- indeed, the value of all trade preferences for these African countries -
could multiply with time. And it would be interesting to explore the overall
effect of the Sino-African cooperation, including technical assistance and
investment in infrastructure, on the economic growth of African LDCs in
the near future.
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Figure 2.1: Chinese average imports from African LDCs
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Note: lnimpc1p1 is China’s average imports of eligible products from treated
countries; whereas lnimpc1p0 is the average imports of non-eligible products from
treated countries; the other two variables are defined in a similar way, which
represents the average imports of eligible and non-eligible products from countries
in control group.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No. of Obs.
year 2004.5 1.708 2002 2007 244081
imp 37357.246 2297976.233 0 455000000 244081
lnimp 0.228 1.519 0 19.936 244081
dimp 0.025 0.157 0 1 244081
dp 0.248 0.423 0 1 244081
dc 0.347 0.476 0 1 244081
dt 0.5 0.5 0 1 244081
DD 0.124 0.324 0 1 244081
ct 0.174 0.379 0 1 244081
cp 0.086 0.276 0 1 244081
DDD 0.043 0.2 0 1 244081
dpcodea 0.044 0.2 0 1 244081
dpcodem 0.028 0.164 0 1 244081
dpcodet 0.056 0.228 0 1 244081
dpcodeo 0.12 0.319 0 1 244081
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Table 2.2: DDD Estimate of Impact of Tariff-Free on Chinese Imports
Product/year Pre-AAAP After-AAAP Time
Periods Periods Difference
A. Treatment country
eligible products 0.2963 0.4077 0.1114
(1.7433) (2.1511) (0.0261)
[11250] [11250]
Non-eligible products 0.0187 0.0548 0.0361
(0.4200) (0.7103) (0.0047)
[31125] [31125]
product difference: 0.2776 0.3528
(0.0106) (0.0139)
Difference-in-
difference:
0.0753
(0.0175)
B. Control countries
eligible products 0.4139 0.5926 0.1787
(2.038) (2.4713) (0.0220)
[21150] [21150]
Non-eligible products 0.1632 0.2491 0.0860
(1.2556) (1.5458) (0.0082)
[58515] [58515]
product difference: 0.2508 0.3434
(0.0121) (0.0147)
Difference-in-
difference:
0.0927
(0.0190)
DDD: -0.0174
(0.291)
Notes: Cells contain mean log of imports values for the group identified.
Standard errors are reported in parenteses; sample size are given in square brackets.
Years before/after tariff change, and treated/countrol products/countries, are de-
fined in the text.
DDD is the difference-in-difference from the upper panel minus that in the lower
panel.
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results for the Benchmark Specification
Dependent Variable lnIMP lnIMP lnIMP Dimport
Sample full Africa LDCs eligible products full
Method triple-diffs diff-in-diffs diff-in-diffs triple-diffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marginal Effects -0.6 % 9.1% -6.5% -0.4%
Ineffect*Ctry*Prod -0.00573 -0.00368*
(0.0184) (0.00217)
Ineffect*Prod 0.0869**
(0.0183)
Ineffect*Ctry -0.0672*
(0.0357)
Country/product FEs yes no no yes
Year FEs yes yes yes yes
Observations 244080 84750 64800 244080
Number of FEs 40684 5 5 40684
Notes: Robust t statistics are given in parentheses; * significant at 5%, ** significant
at 1%.
Controls in columns (1) and (4) include country-product interactive dummies and
year dummies.
Controls in column (2) includes additive country and year dummies.
Controls in column (3) includes additive product and year dummies.
Marginal effects are calculated as (exp(βˆ)− 1).
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Table 2.4: Timing of the Treatment Effect
Dependent Variable lnIMP import dummy
Sample full full
Method triple-diffs triple-diffs
(1) (2)
Marginal Effects
2005(t*) -3.8% -0.5%
2006(t*+1) -1.0% -0.5 %
2007(t*+2) 3.2% -0.07%
Ineffect*Ctry*Prod
2005(t*) -0.0389 -0.00520
(-1.71) (-1.93)
2006(t*+1) -0.0102 -0.00518
(-0.45) (-1.93)
2007(t*+2) 0.0319 -0.000662
(1.40) (-0.25)
Fixed Effects country/product country/product
year year
Observations 244080 244080
Number of FEs 40684 40684
Notes: Robust t statistics are given in parentheses; * significant at 5%, ** significant
at 1%.
Controls in column (1) and (2) include a full set of country-product interactive
dummies and year dummies.
Marginal effects are calculated as exp(βˆ)− 1.
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Table 2.5: Treatment Effects across Sub-Categories
Dependent Variable lnIMP import dummy
Sample full full
Method triple-diffs triple-diffs
(1) (2)
Marginal Effects
Agriculture 14.2% 0.98%
Minerals 2.2% 0.6%
Textiles -15.8% -1.7%
Others 1.7% -0.4%
Ineffect*Ctry*Prod
Agriculture 0.133*** 0.00979**
(3.39) (2.12)
Minerals 0.0216 0.00611
(0.45) (1.08)
Textiles -0.172*** -0.0174***
(-5.01) (-4.27)
Others 0.0169 -0.00399
(0.68) (-1.37)
Fixed Effects country/product country/product
year year
Observations 244080 244080
Number of FEs 40684 40684
Notes: Robust t statistics are given in parentheses; * significant at 5%, ** significant
at 1%.
Controls in both columns include a full set of country-product interactive dummies,
and year dummies.
Marginal effects are calculated as exp(βˆ)− 1.
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Appendix
Products Qualifying for Chinese Preferences to African LDCs
(by HS 8-digit code)
No. HS tariff Description Margin
Code of Preference
1 01063990 Birds, nes 10
2 01069090 Other live animals, not edible 10
3 03033300 Frozen sole 12
4 03033900 Frozen flat fish (excl. halibut, plaice & sole) 10
5 03035000 Frozen herrings (excl. livers & roes) 10
6 03037100 Frozen sardines, brisling or sprats 12
7 03037910 Frozen scabber fish (trichurius) 10
8 03037990 Frozen fish, nes 10
9 03038000 Frozen fish livers & roes 10
10 03049000 Frozen fish meat (excl. fillets) 10
11 03055920 Dried sharks’ fins, not smoked 15
12 03055990 Other dried fish, not smoked 16
13 03061319 Frozen shrimps in shell 5
14 03061329 Frozen prawns in shell 5
15 03061490 Other frozen crabs, nes 10
16 03074900 Cuttle fish & squid, frozen, dried, saltd or in brine 12
17 03075900 Octopus,frozen, dried, salted or in brine 17
18 03079920 Sea cucumbers, frozen, dried, salted or in brine 10
19 05071000 Ivory, its powder & waste, unworked 10
20 05080090 Coral; shells of molluscs, crustaceans,etc, not cut to shape 12
21 05119111 Fertilized fish eggs 12
22 05119119 Other products of fish 12
23 05119190 Products of crustaceans,molluscs or other aquatic 12
invertebrates;dead animals of chapter 3
24 06049900 Parts of plants, without flowers or buds 10
25 08013100 Cashew nuts, in shell,fresh or dried 20
26 09011100 Coffee, not roasted or decaffeinated 8
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27 09011200 Decaffeinated coffee, not roasted 8
28 09050000 Vanilla 15
29 09070000 Cloves (whole fruit, cloves & stems) 3
30 12074090 Sesamum seeds excl for sowing 10
31 12119050 Plants and parts of plants, used in perfumery 8
32 12122090 Edible seaweeds and other algae, fresh chilled frozen or dried nes 15
33 13012000 Gum arabic 15
34 13019020 Olibanum, myrrh and dragon’s blood 3
35 14019090 Other vegetable plaiting materials, nes 10
36 14049000 Vegetable products, nes 15
37 15131900 Coconut copra oil (excl. crude) & fractions thereof 9.5
38 16041990 Prepared or preserved fish (excl. minced), nes 12
39 18010000 Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted 8
40 18040000 Cocoa butter, fat & oil 22
41 20041000 Potatoes, preserved other than by vinegar or acetic acid, frozen 13
42 25061000 Quartz 3
43 25062100 Crude or roughly trimmed quartzite 3
44 25062900 Quartzite cut into blocks or slabs of a rectangular shape 3
45 25084000 Other clays, nes, whether or not calcined 3
46 25085000 Andalusite, kyanite & sillimanite, whether or not calcined 3
47 25140000 Slate, whether or not roughly trimmed or cut into blocks 3
or slabs of a rectangular (incl. square) shape
48 25151100 Marble & travertine crude or roughly trimmed 4
49 25161100 Granite, crude or roughly trimmed 4
50 25162100 Sandstone, crude or roughly trimmed 3
51 25171000 Pebbles, gravel, broken or crushed stone, commonly used for 4
concrete aggregates, for road metalling or for railway
or other ballast, shingle & flint, whether or not heat-treated
52 25174900 Granules, chippings & powder, of stones(excl. marble) 3
of heading 25.15 & 25.16, whether or not heat-treated
53 25309091 Wollastonite 3
54 25309099 Mineral substances, nes 3
55 26203000 Ash & residues containing mainly copper & compound thereof 4
56 27101991 Lubricating oils 6
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57 27141000 Bituminous or oil shale & tar sands 6
58 29071990 Monophenols and their salts, nes 5.5
59 29095000 Ether-phenols, ether-alcohol-phenols and their halogenatd, 5.5
sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives
60 29157090 Palmitic acid, its salts and esters; salts and esters of stearic acid 5.5
61 29392100 Quinine and its salts 4
62 33011300 Essential oils of lemon (incl. concretes & absolutes) 20
63 33012990 Essential oils other than of citrus fruit 15
64 33019090 Concentrates of essential oils in fats,in fixed oils , in waxes; 20
terpenic by-products of the deterpenation of essential oils;
aqueous distillates & aqueous solutions of essential oils
65 33029000 Odoriferous substances used as raw materials in other industry 10
66 34031900 Lubricating preparations, containing petroleum oils or 10
oils obtained from bituminous minerals and their weight <70%
67 39152000 Waste, parings & scrap, of polymers of styrene 9.7
68 39159010 Waste, parings & scrap, of diglycol terephthalate of styrene 9.7
69 39159090 Waste, parings & scrap, of other plastics, nes 9.7
70 39191099 Self-adhesive tape, plates, strip, sheet , film , 6.5
foil & other flat shapes, of plastics, in rolls, width≤20cm,nes
71 39219090 Other plates, strips, sheet, film of plastics, nes 6.5
72 39229000 Bidets, lavatory pans & other sanitary ware of plastics, nes 10
73 39269010 Machine or instruments parts of plastics 10
74 39269090 Articles of plastics, nes 10
75 40111000 New pneumatic tyres, of rubber of a kind used on motor cars 10
76 40169310 Gaskets, washers/seals of vulcanized rubber for machines 8
77 41041111 Chrome-tanned bovine leather (wet blue skin leather), 7
full grains, unsplit, or grain splits, not further prepared
78 41041911 Wet blue bovine leather, not further prepared, nes 7
79 41051010 Wet-blue sheep or lamb skin leather, without 14
wool on, but not further prepared, whether or not split
80 41051090 Sheep or lamb skin leather, in the wet state 10
other than wet-blue, without wool on, but not
further prepared, whether or not split
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81 41053000 Sheep or lamb skin leather, in the dry state(crust), 8
without wool on, but not further prepared, whether or not split
82 41062100 Goat or kid skin leather, in the wet state(incl. wet-blue), 14
without hair on, but not further prepared, whether or not split
83 41064000 Leather of reptiles, tanned or crust, without hair on, 14
but not further prepared, whether or not split
84 41079200 Leather further prepared after tanning or crusting, 5
including parchment-dressed leather, of bovine (including buffalo)
or equine animals, without hair on, whether or not split
85 41120000 Leather further prepared after tanning or crusting, 8
parchment-dressed leather, of sheep or lamb, without wool on,
whether or not split, other than leather of heading
86 41131000 Leather further prepared after tanning or crusting, 14
including parchment-dressed leather, of goats or kids,
without wool or hair on, whether or not split
87 41133000 Leather further prepared after tanning or crusting, including 14
parchment-dressed leather, of reptiles, without wool or hair on,
whether or not split, other than leather of heading 41.14
88 42022200 Handbags, whether or not with shoulder strap, 10
incl. those without handle, with outer surface
of plastic sheeting or of textile materials
89 42023100 Articles of a kind normally carried in the pocket or handbag, 10
with outer surface of leather, of composition or patent leather
90 42023200 Articles of a kind normally carried in the pocket or handbag, 20
with outer surface of plastic sheeting or of textile materials
91 42029200 Tool bags, cutlery cases and containers nes, 10
with outer surface of plastic sheeting or of textile materials
92 44201010 Wood or bamboo carvings 0
93 44201090 Statuettes and other ornaments, of wood, nes 0
94 44209090 Caskets and cases for jewellery or cutlery, and 0
similar articles, of wood; wooden articles
or furniture not falling in Chapter 94
95 46012029 Mats, matting and screens of grass or straw (other than rushes) 9
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96 46019199 Plaits materials, plaits and similar products of plaiting materials, 9
bond together in parallel strands or woven, in sheet form,
whether or not being finished articles,
of other vegetable plaiting material, nes
97 46021020 Basketwork, wickerwork and other articles, of grass or straw 9
98 49100000 Calendars of any kind, printed, including calendar blocks 7.5
99 51081000 Carded yarn of fine animal hair, not put up for retail sale 5
100 52052100 Combed single cotton yarn, with ≥ 85% cotton, nprs ≤ 14mn 5
101 52053200 Uncombed cabled cotton yarn,
with≥85% cotton, nprs>14mn but ≤43mn 5
102 52054200 Combed cabled cotton yarn, with≥85% cotton, 5
nprs>14mn but≤43mn
103 52083200 Dyed plain cotton weave, with≥85% cotton, 10
>100g/m2,≤200g/m2
104 52085200 Printed plain cotton weave, with≥85% cotton, 10
>100g/m2,≤200g/m2
105 52091100 Unbleached plain cotton weave, with≥85% cotton, >200g/m2 10
106 52105900 Printed woven cotton fabrics, nes, with<85% cotton,≤200g/m2 10
107 53041000 Sisal & other textile fibres of the genus Agave, raw 5
108 53049000 Sisal, etc (excl. raw), not spun; tow & waste of these fibres 5
109 53082000 True hemp yarn 6
110 54076100 Other woven fabrics of synthetic yarn, 10
≥85% non-textured polyester
111 54079200 Dyed woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn, nes 10
112 55081000 Sewing thread of synthetic staple fibres 5
113 58012200 Cut corduroy of cotton 10
114 58071000 Labels, badges and similar articles of textiles, woven, in piece, 10
in strips or cut to shape or size, not embriodered
115 61033200 Men’s or boys’ jackets & blazers of cotton, knitted or crocheted 16
116 61043200 Women’s or girls’ jackets, of cotton, knitted or crocheted 16
117 61061000 Women’s or girls’ blouses, etc, of cotton, knitted or crocheted 16
118 61091000 T-shirts, singlets & other vests, of cotton, knitted or crocheted 14
119 61099090 T-shirts, singlets, etc, of other textiles, nes, knitted/crocheted 14
120 61101100 Jerseys, pullovers, etc, of wool, knitted or crocheted 14
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121 61102000 Jerseys, pullovers, etc, of cotton, knitted or crocheted 14
122 61178000 Other clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted, nes 14
123 62031100 Men’s or boys’ suits of wool or fine animal hair 17.5
124 62033200 Men’s or boys’ jackets & blazers of cotton 16
125 62033300 Men’s or boys’ jackets & blazers of synthetic fibres 17.5
126 62033990 Men’s or boys’ jackets & blazers of other textl materials, nes 16
127 62034990 Men’s or boys’ trousers, breeches, nes, of oth textile fibres 16
128 62043100 Women’s or girls’ jackets & blazers of wool or fine animal hair 16
129 62045990 Women’s or girls’ skirts of other textile materials, nes 14
130 62046200 Women’s or girls’ trousers, breeches, etc, of cotton 16
131 62052000 Men’s or boys’ shirts of cotton 16
132 62053000 Men’s or boys’ shirts of man-made fibres 16
133 62069000 Women’s or girls’ blouses, shirts, etc, of other textiles, nes 16
134 62079100 Men’s or boys’ singlets, dressing gowns, etc, of cotton 14
135 62159000 Ties, bow ties & cravats of other textiles, nes 14
136 62179000 Parts of garments or of clothing accessories, nes 14
137 68021010 Tiles etc of marble, side < 7cm; artificial colored granuls,powder 24
138 68029990 Worked building stone and articles thereof, nes 24
139 68159900 Articles of stone or of other mineral substances nes 17.5
140 71023100 Diamonds non-industrial unworked or simply sawn, 3
cleaved or bruted
141 71031000 Precious or semi-precious stones (other than diamonds), 3
unworked or simply sawn or rough shaped
142 71049099 Synthetic/reconstructed precious/semi-precious stones, 8
further worked, not for technical use
143 71162000 Articles of precious or semi-precious stones 35
(natural,synthectic or reconstructed)
144 71171900 Imitation jewellery nes of base metal 17
145 72022900 Ferro-silicon, nes 2
146 73089000 Structure/parts nes, plate,rods etc prepared 4
for use in structures,of iron/steel
147 73181500 Bolts and screws nes, whether or not 8
with their nuts or washers,of iron/steel
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148 74011000 Cu mattes 2
149 74020000 Cu unrefined, Cu anodes for electrolytic refining 2
150 74031100 Cu cathodes & sections of cathodes unwrought 2
151 74040000 Waste & scrap, Cu/Cu alloy 1.5
152 74199990 Articles of Cu, nes, not for technical use 20
153 75022000 Ni unwrought, alloyed 3
154 76011000 Al unwrought, not alloyed 5
155 76020000 Waste & scrap, Al 1.5
156 81052000 Cobalt,unwrought,intermediate products,powders 4
157 81059000 Cobalt wrought & articles thereof 8
158 83024900 Mountings, fittings & similar articles of base metal, nes 12
159 83081000 Hooks,eyes & eyelets of base metal 10.5
160 83089000 Claps,buckles & like, beads & spangles of base metal 10.5
161 84139100 Parts of pumps for liquids 5
162 84314310 Parts of oil/gas boring machinery 4
163 84339090 Parts of other machines of heading 84.33 3
164 84701000 Electronic calculators, operating without external source of power 0
operating without external source of power
165 84821000 Bearings, ball 8
166 84829900 Bearing parts, nes 6
167 84831090 Transmission shafts not for ships; cranks 6
168 84834090 Gears/gearing,ball screws,gear boxes,speed changers, etc 8
169 84839000 Parts of applianced of heading No. 84.83 8
170 84849000 Gasket sets consisting of gaskets of different materials 8
171 85011099 Electric motors of an output≤37.5 W, nes 9
172 85021100 Generating sets,diesel or semi-diesel engines, output≤75 KVA 10
173 85139010 Parts of torches of subheading No. 8513.1010 14
174 85189000 Parts of microphones, loudspeakers, headphones, 10.5
earphones&elec sound amplier sets
175 85245390 Other recorded magnetic tapes, width>6.5 mm, nes 10
176 85389000 Parts for switches, fuses,panels and etc s 7
of heading No 85.35 & 85.36, nes
177 87120041 Cross-country bicycles, 16’, 18’, 20’ 13
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178 90183100 Syringes, with or without needles 8
179 90229090 Parts & accessories of apparatus of 90.22, nes 6
180 90230000 Instruments/apparatus/models, for demonstrational purposes 7
181 90328900 Automatic regulating or controlling instruments & apparatus, nes 7
182 91051100 Electric alarm clocks 23
183 92099200 Parts & accessories for musical instruments of heading No 92.02 17.5
184 94016900 Seats with wooden frames, nes 0
185 94035099 Bedroom furniture, wooden, nes 0
186 94036099 Furniture, wooden, nes 0
187 96020090 Workd veg/mineral carving material/artcls, mould/carved articles 25
188 96071100 Slide fasteners fitted with chain scoops of base metal 21
189 96081000 Ball point pens 15
190 97030000 Original sculptures & statuary, in any material 12
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Chapter 3
SSSAP and Economic
Growth in China
3.1 Introduction
Since the concept of human capital was introduced in modern economic
analysis by Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964), it has been widely used in
academic studies and policy analysis. The latest definition of human cap-
ital is from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), as “the knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied
in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic
well-being” (OECD, 2001, page 18).
Endogenous growth models highlight the central role played by human
capital in technological development and economic growth. In the papers
by Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1997) etc., the accumulation of human capital through
education and on-the-job trainning fosters economic growth by improving
labor productivity, and by promoting technological innovation and adapta-
tion. On the empirical side, numerous cross-country studies have extensively
explored whether or not educational attainment contributes significantly to
the production of overall output in an economy, and have established a
positive correlation between human capital and economic growth.
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This is also true for China. Since the start of economic reforms, China’s
economy has grown at a dramatic rate, and it is widely believed that human
capital has played a significant role in the Chinese economic miracle. For
instance, Wang and Yao (2003) find that human capital has contributed 11
percent to China’s economic growth during the reform period (1978-1999).
A more recent study by Whalley and Zhao (2010) re-examines the role of
human capital in China’s growth, and they find that human capital plays
a much more important role than available literature suggests, 38.1% of
economic growth over 1978-2008, and even higher for 1999-2008.
Education, as one of the most important ways of accumulating human
capital, is therefore fundamental to social and economic development. From
the view point of the Chinese government, sustaining rapid economic growth
in the future will come to depend in large part on the quantity and quality
of the human resources it can mobilize. Getting education policy right,
particularly policy on higher education, could unlock the enormous potential
of China’s large population and spread the benefits of growth to all groups
in society.
In this paper, we study a specific education policy, the State-Sponsored
Study Abroad Programmes (SSSAP), which have been introduced in the
recent years. Starting in 1996, the SSSAP are designed to select and sup-
port high-level personnel to pursue higher education in foreign universities,
mainly in Western developed countries, in order to “innovate mechanisms,
integrate resources, prioritize focus, achieve leap-flogging development ”
(China Scholarship Council, CSC). Even if as of today the personnel enrolled
in the programs account for only a small portion of the highly educated pop-
ulation in China, the effects of such programs are likely not to be negligible.
At the same time, the SSSAP will have an impact on the investment in
domestic higher education given the limited availability of educational ex-
penditure. The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of SSSAP on
China’s economic growth in a Lucas-type endogenous growth model. In or-
der to explore these effects, two types of human capital, home-educated and
foreign-educated human capital, are incorporated in the model.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
some background information on Chinese higher education, and in particu-
lar on the SSSAP. The model and its balanced growth path are presented in
section III. Section IV determines the growth-maximizing share of govern-
ment spending on education, and the optimal allocation between domestic
and foreign education. Section V resorts to numerical techniques to examine
the effect of investment in education on economic performance, and the im-
pact of a switch in government spending from domestic education to foreign
education, given the fixed total expenditure. The final section summarizes
the results and discusses some policy implications.
3.2 Background
To face the demand arising from rapid economic growth, the Chinese gov-
ernment has recently increased expenditure on education, and in 2008,
the public-spending-to-GDP ratio has reached 3.48%. According to The
Medium- and Long-term National Education Reform and Development Plan
(2010-20), the government investment will increase steadily, with the ratio
of education expenditure to gross domestic product expected to reach 4%
by 2010. The education policy is skewed towards higher education which
absorbs more than one quarter of total government expenditure on educa-
tion, even if the enrollment rate in tertiary education reaches only 21.5 of
the relevant age group.
Simultaneously, the Chinese government has accelerated the process of
human capital accumulation through foreign training. In 1996, the State
Sponsored Study Abroad Progammes was introduced, and under its auspices
government shcolarship programmes ramped up quickly. Through these
programs, the Chinese government provides return international airfare and
a living stipend, while the tuition and research fees are paid by the host
universities. There is great variety among the 185 SSSAP: some program
target rural Western provinces, others favor specific ethnic minorities, and
still others are designed solely for researchers and scholars working at top
universities and research centers. Meanwhile, some areas are prioritized,
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including energy, environment, life sciences, space and maritime study, etc.
The State-Sponsored Study Abroad Programmes have been growing very
rapidly since their inception. As shown in Figure 3.1, in 1996, when the
first program was launched, only 2044 students were enrolled, and the figure
remains small in the following years until 2005. However, in 2008, a total
of 12,957 students/scholars were recruited for all types of state sponsored
study abroad programs, a 6.5 times increase compared to the recruitment
in 1996.
The SSSAP can be roughly divided into 5 major categories. Figure 3.2
shows the distribution of students/scholars across progammes. It clearly
shows that the large portion of scholarships are given to senior scholars and
doctoral students, contributing directly to the strengthening of domestic
capacity in the tertiary education sector. In 2008, 3,845 were senior re-
search scholar, 3,459 doctoral students, and 2,496 post-doctoral researchers,
accounting for 30%, 27%, and 19% of the total, respectively.
One of the potential problems in implementing and managing these pro-
grams is students’ behavior of breaching the contract, such as staying over-
due. However, we have observed a quite high rate of return. During 1996-
2008, a total of 48,605 have been sent abroad with 37,494 due to return, the
actual return number reaches 36,614, with a return rate as high as 97.65%.
Particularly in 2008, the return rate is as high as 98.34%. And it is believed
that the return rate will remain at a quite high level due to China’s strong
economic growth.
3.3 The Economy
In this section, we examine the State-Sponsored Study Abroad Programmes
in an endogeneous growth model with human capital. More specifically, we
employ a Uzawa-Lucas (1988) type framework, with human capital produc-
tion, which has been adapted to include educational expenditure by Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992). The key feature of the model is that the current
level of human capital affects not only the production of final output, but
also the accumulation of human capital.
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We consider an infinite horizon, continuous time model with physical and
human capital accumulation. The economy is populated by a large number
of identical infinitely-lived representative households; and for purpose of
simplicity, we assume population to be constant and normalize it to one. The
economy consists of three sectors: a productive sector, a household sector,
and the government. The government provides education services that are
used in the production of human capital by collecting a proportional tax on
output.
3.3.1 Production
The productive sector can be further divided into two sectors. The first
sector produces final goods using physical capital and effective workforce as
inputs. These goods can be consumed or invested in the creation of phys-
ical capital goods and human capital. The second sector produces human
capital, using physical goods as well as human capital, as inputs. There
are two types of human capital held by different individuals. The first type
of human capital, home-educated human capital, denoted by H1, applies
to human capital of individuals who pursue higher education in their home
country. The second type of human capital, foreign-educated human cap-
ital is denoted by H2, and captures the human capital of individuals who
receives higher education in foreign countries.
We set up a Cobb-Douglas production function for final goods Y that
exhibits constant returns to physical capital and two types of human capital,
K, H1 and H2:
Y = KαHσ1H
1−α−σ
2 (3.3.1)
where, 0 < α, σ, 1 − α − σ < 1, and K is aggregate physical capital. Thus,
production exhibits constant returns to scale in all factors, with diminishing
returns with respect to each of them. For simplicity, we do not model
technological process in this paper.
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3.3.2 The household sector
Abstracting from labor-learning-leisure choices, and assuming no govern-
ment provided utility-enhancing services, the representative household max-
imizes the discounted stream of utility generated from goods consumption,
C, over an infinite time horizon subject to its budget constraint. We assume
that the intertemporal utility derived by the agent can be represented by a
log utility function, so that the household problem is represented by,
max U =
∫
∞
0
e−ρt ln(C)dt (3.3.2)
where C is aggregate consumption and ρ is the subjective discount rate.
As argued by Agenor (2009), abstracting from labor-leisure choices is a
reasonable assumption in a model designed for low-income countries. People
in low-income countries are unlikely to consume much leisure given the very
low income they can earn.
The after-tax consumer resource can be either spent on consumption
or accumulated as physical capital. For simplicity, we assume that there
are no financial assets and that the public sector cannot issue debt. The
main advantage derived from the non existence of financial assets or public
debt is that instantaneous budget balance entails the fulfillment of the single
present value budget constraint, both for the consumer and the government.
In the absence of depreciation of physical capital, the consumer’s budget
constraint can be written as follows
K˙ = (1− τ)Y − C (3.3.3)
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is the tax rate on output, which is assumed to be constant
over time.
The representative agent takes public choices as given when maximizing
his discounted stream of utility. To solve the optimization problem, we
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formulate the present-value Hamiltonian, which is written as: 1
J = e−ρt ln(C) + µ[(1− τ)KαHσ1H
1−α−σ
2 − C] (3.3.4)
where the costate variable, µ, denotes the shadow price of physical capital.
The boundary conditions include initial values K(0) = K0 > 0, and also
the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
µe−ρtK(t) = 0
Maximizing the present-value Hamiltonian yields the fimilar first-order
condition
∂J
∂C
= e−ρt
1
C
− µ = 0 (3.3.5)
which says that goods must be allocated to be equally valuable, on the
margin, if they are used either for consumption or for investment.
Meanwhile, the derivatives of the state variable satisfying the optimum
growth path is given by
µ˙ = −
∂J
∂K
= −µα(1− τ)(
K
H2
)α−1(
H1
H2
)σ (3.3.6)
Combining the two expressions above yields the growth rate of consump-
tion,
C˙
C
= −
µ˙
µ
− ρ = α(1 − τ)(
K
H2
)α−1(
H1
H2
)σ − ρ (3.3.7)
3.3.3 Production of human capital
Recall that by assumption human capital is produced only by the public
sector. Our main departure from the Uzawa-Lucas model lies in incorpo-
rating two types of human capital held by different individuals. The first
type of human capital, home-educated human capital, denoted by H1, ap-
plies to human capital of individuals who pursue higher education in their
1J is used to avoid confusion since H is reserved to denote human capital; and
time index t is omitted.
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home country.2 The second type of human capital, foreign-educated human
capital, denoted by H2, associates with human capital of individuals who
receives higher education in foreign countries.
The home-educated human capital is subject to the production of the
home country’s education sector. We postulate a technology relating the
growth of home-educated human capital to the level of human capital al-
ready attained and the public resources spent on education. More specifi-
cally, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), the production of human capital
is specified as a Cobb-Douglas function of government spending on educa-
tion, ID, and the existing stock of human capital, H1.
We also assume that the home-educated human capital is subject to
a positive externality from returned foreign-educated human capital, H2.
The emerging “Brain Circulation” from Silicon Valley to countries such as
China and India justifies such a positive externality on the education sec-
tors of these countries. “Brain Circulation” describes the phenomenon that
a large number of foreign-born talents in Silicon Valley (the majority of
them are engineering graduates from Top US universities) who have trans-
fered advanced technology and institutional know-how to the home country.
One channel is through the government of the home country, since these
young talents tend to serve as government advisers in research and develop-
ment projects, technical education, the adoption of information technology
in the public sector and constructing science parks. Another channel is that
these returned engineers cooperate with local universities or research insti-
tutes in developing new technologies. Through both channels, they have
a substantial impact on the development of the home country’s education
sector.
Assuming that there is no depreciation for home-educated human capi-
tal, the changes in this type of human capital thus could be described by:
H˙1 = BI
δ
DH
1−δ
1 (H2/H1)
ǫ (3.3.8)
2By “higher education”, we refer to university or college studies, including both
undergraduate and graduate level studies.
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where, B > 0 is the technology parameter for the education sector in the
home country which is exogenously given, and ǫ is the externality parameter.
As for the foreign-eduated human capital, we assume that it is not a
product of the home country’s higher education, instead, it accumulates
according to some exogenously given law of motion. More specifically, the
accumulation foreign-educated human capital is related to home country’s
investment and the productivity of the education sector in host countries.
However, studying abroad can involve high relocation costs, as well as
costs associated with learning the host country’s language, identifying qual-
ity educational institutions, and more. We characterize these frictions as
adjustment costs that occur as the human capital is “installed”. The ad-
justment cost also helps us justify the home country’s retention of a domestic
education sector. Absent adjustment costs, the higher productivity of edu-
cation sector in host countries would lead the home country to accumulate
its human capital completely through foreign education.
The law of motion for foreign-educated human capital, in the absence of
depreciation, is given by
H˙2 = B
∗IF [1− φ(H2/H1)] (3.3.9)
where B∗ captures the productivity of the education sector in western de-
veloped countries, and it is assumed that B∗ > B. Every unit of human
capital investment incurs φ units of adjustment costs, which is a function
of the ratio of foreign-educated human capital to home-educated human
capital, H2/H1.
To further simplify the analysis, we assume a quadratic form for φ, and it
is constructed in such a way that the adjustment costs are zero in the steady
state. We denote the adjustment cost associated with foreign-educated hu-
man capital as:
φ(H2/H1) = (H2/H1 −H
ss
2 /H
ss
1 )
2/2 (3.3.10)
where Hss2 ,H
ss
1 are the steady-state values of home- and foreign-education
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human capital, respectively. The adjustment cost is a decreasing function
of the ratio of home-educated to foreign-educated human capital, when its
value is less than its steady-state value. At the same time, the adjustment
cost is increasing in the ratio of home-educated to foreign-edcuated human
capital.3
Therefore, the equation describing the accumulation of foreign-educated
human capital is given by
H˙2 = B
∗IF [1− (H2/H1 −H
ss
2 /H
ss
1 )
2/2] (3.3.11)
3.3.4 Government
The government collects a proportional tax on output to finance education.
It provides education services that are used in the production of human
capital. Furthermore, the government selects a fraction p of agents and
support them to study abroad, in order to improve domestic human capital
through foreign training. We assume zero non-return rate of state-sponsored
students/scholars, since the actual return rate is as high as 97.65% during
1996-2008.
Given that the government budget constraint is assumed to be balanced
in every period, we have
pIF + (1− p)ID = τY (3.3.12)
Both components of public spending could be specified as fractions of
total tax revenues, by defining IF = θID, where θ > 1 is the relative invest-
ment on home-education and foreign education. In other words,
ID = vτY, where v ≡
1
[(θ − 1)p+ 1]
3Increasing marginal costs in education are highly plausible. Developing coun-
tries, may, for example, have limited capacity to prepare students for study abroad.
Language training is a particularly high hurdle. Large volume of students studying
abroad also require the developing country to send students to more host countries
(and possible train students in more host country languages) and that may further
raise adjustment costs.
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3.4 Balanced Growth Path
To characterize the equilibrium paths, the easiest way is to begin by seeking
balanced growth solutions of the system. The balanced growth equilibrium
is determined as follows. Let c ≡ CK , k ≡
K
H2
, h ≡ H1H2 . Equations (3.3.3),
(3.3.7), (3.3.8) and (3.3.11) can be rewritten as
K˙
K
= (1− τ)kα−1hσ − c (3.4.1)
C˙
C
= α(1 − τ)kα−1hσ − ρ (3.4.2)
H˙1
H1
= B(vτ)δkαδhσδ−δ−ǫ (3.4.3)
H˙2
H2
= B∗(1− v)τkαhσ [1−
1
2
h−2 + (
Hss2
Hss1
)h−
1
2
(
Hss2
Hss1
)2] (3.4.4)
These equations, together with the initial condition, and the transver-
sality condition, limt→∞ µe
−ρtK(t) = 0, characterize the dynamics of the
economy. This yields the following definition:
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium corresponds to a set of func-
tions {c, k, h}∞t=0 and a constant tax rate τ such that individuals maximize
utility, firms maximize profits, markets clears, and the government budget is
balanced. Thus, equations (3.4.1)-(3.4.4), the transversality condition, and
the government budget constraint must all be satisfied.
Based on this, a balanced growth equilibrium can also be defined.
Definition 2. The balanced growth equilibrium is a competitive equi-
librium in which consumption and the stock of physical capital, as well as
human capital, all grow at the same constant rate, that is, C˙/C = K˙/K =
H˙1/H1 = H˙2/H2 = γ, and the prices of physical and human capital are
declining at constant rates.
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From equations (3.4.1)-(3.4.4), the constant steady-state growth rate γ
is given by the following equivalent forms,
γ = (1− τ)k˜α−1h˜σ − c˜ (3.4.5)
γ = α(1− τ)k˜α−1h˜σ − ρ (3.4.6)
γ = B(vτ)δ k˜αδh˜σδ−δ−ǫ (3.4.7)
γ = B∗(1− v)τ k˜αh˜σ (3.4.8)
where c˜, k˜, h˜ respectively denote the stationary value of c, k and h. Recall
that at the steady state, the adjustment costs of installing foreign-educated
human capital die out, thus its growth rate is simplified as equation (3.4.8).
3.5 Growth-Maximizing Policies
There are a variety of objectives that are commonly used to motivate govern-
ment fiscal action, including welfare maximization, stabilization and growth
maximization. Typically, maximization of welfare is characterized as the pri-
ority of benevolent governments. It involves, in this case, a central planner
choosing optimally all quantities and policy instruments so as to maximize
the household’s discounted lifetime utility subject to appropriate constraints.
By using the Hamiltonian procedure, a complete characterization of the dy-
namics of the model can be conducted along the lines outlined in the previous
section. However, the complexity of the model precludes an analytical so-
lution here. Therefore, we will focus on growth-maximizing policies in this
section.
3.5.1 Optimal tax rate
We first examine the determination of the optimal tax rate, holding ex-
penditure shares constant. This can be obtained by setting ∂γ/∂τ = 0 in
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equation (3.4.6), which yields the following equation,
∂γ
∂τ
= −αk˜α−1h˜σ+α(α−1)(1−τ)k˜α−2h˜σ(
dk˜
dτ
)+ασ(1−τ)k˜α−1h˜σ−1(
dh˜
dτ
) = 0
(3.5.1)
Let εk˜/τ and εh˜/τ denote the elasticity of the steady-state value of k and
h with respect to tax rate τ , respectively. After some rearrangement, the
condition for the optional tax rate can be simplified to
−τ∗
1− τ∗
+ (α− 1)εk˜/τ + σεh˜/τ = 0 (3.5.2)
Similarly, setting ∂γ/∂τ = 0 in equation (3.4.7) and (3.4.8), we obtain
δ + αδεk˜/τ + (αδ − δ − ǫ)εh˜/τ = 0 (3.5.3)
1 + αεk˜/τ + σεh˜/τ = 0 (3.5.4)
Combining equations (3.5.2), (3.5.3) and (3.5.4) gives the growth-maximizing
value of the tax rate
τ∗ = 1− α (3.5.5)
which means that with spending shares on home- and foreign-educated hu-
man capital held constant, the growth-maximizing tax rate is equal to the
elasticity of output with respect to (total) human capital in our framework.
This result is consistent with the results from previous studies in endogenous
growth models where human capital is present.
3.5.2 Optimal allocation
Next, we consider the optimal fraction of education expenditure to be
devoted to SSSAP, taking the total spending on education as given. This can
be obtained by setting ∂γ/∂p = 0 in equations (3.4.6), (3.4.7) and (3.4.8),
which yields the following system of equations in p, εk˜/p and εh˜/p:
(α− 1)εk˜/p + σεh˜/p = 0 (3.5.6)
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−δ(θ − 1)p
[(θ − 1)p + 1]
+ αδεk˜/p + (σδ − δ − ǫ)εh˜/p = 0 (3.5.7)
1
[(θ − 1)]p + 1]
+ αεk˜/p + σεh˜/p = 0 (3.5.8)
Combining the above equations, we obtain the growth-maximizing frac-
tion of agents who are sent to developed country to accumulate foreign
human capital:
p∗ =
(1− α)(δ + ǫ)− σδ
σδ(θ − 1)
(3.5.9)
The result shows that with the given educational expenditure, its op-
timal allocation between home-education and SSSAP is determined by the
the elasticity of production to human capital, the relative cost of foreign
education, as well as the elasticity of human capital output to government
spending in education.
3.6 Numerical Simulation
Due to the complexity of the model, we resort to numerical techniques to
characterize the growth-maximizing tax rate and allocation of educational
expenditure. The numerical values assigned to the variables and parameters
of the system dwell as much as possible on the existing empirical literature
and are chosen to roughly match some well-documented facts about low-
income developing countries since China as a whole is a low-income country.
The elasticity of final output with respect to physical capital, α, is set
equal to 0.70. Therefore, the elasticity of production with respect to human
capital is around 0.3. As mentioned before, Wang and Yao (2003) find
that human capital has contributed 11 percent to China’s economic growth
during the reform period (1978-1999). However, Whalley and Zhao (2010)
point out that human capital contributes as high as 30% to China’s economic
growth over 1978-2008, and even higher rate for 1999-2008. Therefore, our
value of α lies in a feasible range according to previous studies.
Next consider the human capital technology. The elasticity with respect
to government spending on education services is set equal to 0.3 in the base
case. This is consistent with the parameter values used by Chen (2005). The
54
3.6. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
estimate used here is probably quite relevant for China, where education is
to a very large extent publicly provided.
Regarding the fiscal variable, the tax rate on output, τ , which is also
the share of total government spending on education relative to output,
is set at 0.04. The value of τ used here corresponds to the target value
set by the Chinese government in The Medium- and Long-term National
Education Reform and Development Plan (2010-20). The other government
control variable, p, is calculated in the following way. According to National
Bureau of Statistics of China, there are around 13,000 students/scholars who
enrolled in SSSAP in 2010, and nearly 465,000 in China higher education.
Therefore, the fraction of agents who get scholarship for studying abroad
from the Chinese government is nearly 2.8 percent. In addition, we choose
a value of 5% to examine the effect on growth rate of a larger share of
foreign-eduated human capital.
The values of the remaining parameters are set as follows. The rate of
time preference, ρ, is set at 4%, a fairly conventional choice in the literature.
This leads to a discount factor of approximately 0.96 (see, for instance,
Ghosh and Roy (2004)). The relative cost of foreign-educated human capital,
θ, is set to 5, since the domestic per capital educational expenditure is about
4550 in equivalent USD, while the scholarship from SSSAP is around 20,000
USD per person. Finally, we assume that the productivity of the education
sector in western developed countries is 1.5 times higher than that in China.
In Figure 3.3, we plot the calibrated economic growth rate against tax
rate, taking the allocation of educational expenditure as given. The concav-
ity of the function depicted in Figure 3.3 is very similar to other important
findings in the theory of public finance. The growth rate is rapidly increas-
ing with the tax rate, an increase in the tax rate from 1 to 10 per cent raises
the growth rate by more than 10 percentage points. The growth rate reaches
its maximum when the tax rate is around 30 percent, which is consistent
with our theoretical predictions.
Figure 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show the growth paths of consumption to physical
capital ratio, c, physical capital to foreign-educated human capital ratio, k,
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and home- to foreign-educated human capital ratio, h, respectively. The con-
sumption to physical capital ratio, c, mirrors the pattern of growth rate, and
reaches its peak when the total educational expenditure represents about 30
percent of the GDP. The physical capital to foreign-educated human capi-
tal ratio, k, and home- to foreign-educated human capital ratio, h, share a
similar pattern. They drop sharply when the tax rate moves from 1 to 10
percent, and afterwards remain flat.
Another experiment we carry out is to keep the total educational expen-
diture constant, as to see how the allocation of education expenditure will
affect the growth rate. In the base case, the ratio of educational expenditure
to GDP (i.e. the tax rate in our framework) is 4%, which is the target value
in China’s 11th Five Year Plan, while another educational expenditure-to-
GDP ratio, 30%, is chosen for comparative purpose. From Figure 3.7, we
can easily find that the growth rate increases sharply with the fraction of
agents studying abroad with government sponsorship, but decreases gradu-
ally when this fraction is higher than 30 percent. This result indicates that
the SSSAP cannot efficiently increase the growth after a threshold value,
and might even hurt China’s economy if there is high non-return rate of
students/scholars.
In summary, the calibration results show that the ratio of educational
expenditure to GDP which maximizes China’s economic growth is much
higher than the current level, and thus there is plenty of room for Chinese
government to increase public spending on education. Moreover, a budget-
neutral shift in government spending from home- to foreign-educated human
capital has a positive effect on China’s economy, given the overall structure
of the model and the calibrated parameters. The growth rate will increase
sharply due to the higher productivity of education sector in Western de-
veloped countries. It will then converges to a certain level, which is higher
than the growth rate without state-sponsored studying abroad programmes.
56
3.7. CONCLUSIONS
3.7 Conclusions
Existing empirical studies, for instance Fleisher and Wang (2004), have
shown that human capital plays a significant role in boosting Chinese econ-
omy. However, there has been a huge underinvestment in education. In fact,
China’s government investment in Education is only around 3.5% in year
2008, a quite low value compared with the international standard. Given the
current situation, the question of how to effectively and efficiently allocate
the scarce fiscal funds becomes a big challenge faced by policy makers.
The Chinese government has launched a series of State-Sponsored Study
Abroad programs in recent years. With the proportional tax rate on output
fixed, and therefore the total expenditure on education unchanged, the in-
troduction of such SSSA programs will inevitably decrease the government
spending on domestic education. The goal of this paper has been to ex-
plore the effect on growth rate of such a budget-neutral shift in government
spending.
We examine the SSSAP in an endogenous growth model with two types
of human capital. After describing the model, we have characterized the
balanced growth path of the model. Furthermore, we have solved for the
growth-maximizing tax rate which is used to finance education and the op-
timal allocation of government spending on education between domestic
education and foreign training. It was shown that the optimal tax is equal
to 1 − α, which is the elasticity of final goods with respect to total human
capital. It is also shown that the growth-maximizing allocation of public
spending on education depends on the elasticity of human capital with re-
spect to education expenditure, the relative cost of studying abroad, as well
as the elasticity of final goods with respect to human capital.
Numerical techniques are used to examine, on one hand, the pattern
of growth rates against different ratio of educational expenditure to GDP,
taking the allocation of expenditure as given, and on the other hand, the
pattern of growth rates against different fraction of state-sponsored stu-
dents/scholars, with total education expenditure fixed. The calibration re-
sults show that the educational expenditure-to-GDP ratio which maximizes
57
CHAPTER 3. SSSAP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA
economic growth is always in the range of 0.20-0.35, which is consistent with
our theoretical predictions. The results also show that a budget-neutral shift
from home-educated to foreign-educated human capital is growth-enhancing,
even though it finally leads the growth rate converge to a certain level.
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Figure 3.1: Recruitment of state sponsored study programme from 1996-
2008
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Figure 3.2: The distribution of scholarships across programmes in 2008
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Figure 3.3: Growth rate against tax rate: fixed allocation of education
expenditure
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Figure 3.4: Growth path of consumption to physical capital ratio
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Figure 3.5: Growth path of physical to foreign-educated capital ratio
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Figure 3.6: Growth path of home-educated to foreign-educated capital ratio
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Figure 3.7: Growth rate against allocation: fixed total education expendi-
ture
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Chapter 4
Individual Attitudes towards
Europeanization of
Immigration Policy
4.1 Introduction
Immigration is a crucial issue in 21st century Europe due to its importance
to the evolving EU single market. The population of foreigners in European
Union member countries has risen sharply in recent years and a large share
of jobs is occupied by foreign workers. According to the 2011 International
Migration Outlook, the inflows of foreign population into the EU-25 has
peaked at 2.5 millions in 2009, and the share of foreign-born in total labor
force is greater than 10% in most EU member countries. Facing such large
inflows of foreigners, more and more EU citizens rank the importance of
immigration higher than terrorism, education, environment etc. Immigra-
tion policies in main destination countries also become more restrictive over
the last few decades, although standard economic theories suggest that the
gains from free migration could be very large.
Given the EU’s commitment to free movement of labor within the union,
there is growing awareness both among politicians and academics that at
least some harmonization of immigration policies among the EU countries is
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required. In fact, the EU has been working to build a common immigration
policy ever since the early 1990s. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered
into force in 1999, laid out a plan to develop “an area of freedom, justice and
security”, and represented the first step to develop a common EU migration
policy. The post-Amsterdam period showed some important developments.
In particular, the Lisbon Treaty, which is signed in 2007, significantly widens
the EU’s competences on asylum and immigration policies. It sets for the
EU the specific goal of developing “common policies” for both asylum and
immigration, and further extends qualified majority voting and co-decision
in these areas.
Although the EU has recently gained some influence over immigration
policy, the current situation is far from a common immigration policy. Mem-
ber states have often demonstrated their reluctance to delegate powers to
the supranational institutions, particularly concerning legal labor migration,
by acting outside of the supranational organizations or by including provi-
sions in the treaties. Even though the Lisbon Treaty significantly widens the
EU’s competences on asylum and immigration policies, article 79(5) states
that “this Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine
volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries
to their territory in order to seek work”.
The failure of cooperation on harmonization of immigration policy is
resulting from the heterogeneous preferences over immigration across mem-
ber states. There are considerable differences among the member states in
terms of their labor markets, demographic trends, history of immigration
etc. Former colonial states such as France and the United Kingdom were
already immigration countries in the 19th century, other European states,
such as Germany and Austria, did not become destination countries of im-
migration until after the Second World War. Recently, the southern member
states, such as Italy, also become attractive to immigrants. Besides strong
differences with regard to the migration figures, the geographical origin of
the biggest immigrant groups and immigrants’ levels of qualification also
vary widely from one member state to another. These differences make it
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difficult to reach agreement on cooperation on legal migration policy at the
EU level, because each member state is unlikely to accept a measure which
does not reflect its preferences.
From where does this national opposition to harmonizaiton of immi-
gration policy originate? In democratic societies, government policies will
largely reflect the individual preferences of voters. Politicians are often con-
cerned about getting re-elected, and hence will be interested in the feelings
of the voters. As a result, we expect the citizens’ attitudes to play a role
in shaping the government policies. In particular, individual preferences are
an essential input into any complete model of immigration policy-making.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the opinion of EU citizens as as-
signing responsibilities to European institutions in the domain of immigra-
tion policy from a theoretical and empirical point of view. Why some coun-
tries are more supportive of allocating policy prerogatives to the European
level of government than others? Which different factors are associated with
individual preferences over a common immigration policy? To shed light on
this issue, we develop a simple theoretical model. We find Europeanization
of immigration policy is likely to increase the inflows of low-skilled foreign
workers. We also find that natives’ education levels strongly affect their
support of granting more power to EU institutions.
The structure of the remaining paper is as follow: section II gives a brief
survey of previous literatures on EU integration and determinants of atti-
tudes towards immigrants, while section III presents the simple theoretical
model. In section IV we describe the data used in the empirical analysis
and provide some summary statistics. Results of benchmark models and
robustness checks are respectively presented in section V and section VI.
Finally, section VII concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
Our paper is broadly related to two branches of literature. One is the lit-
erature focus on explaining EU integration, particularly the role of public
opinion in the European integration process; the other is studies which ex-
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amine the determinants of individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants.
There is a wide range of theories that seek to explain EU integration,
such as neo-functionalism, constructivism, federalism, and multi-level gover-
nance. In particular, since Oates (1972), many political economists, drawing
on the fiscal federalism theory, have tried to ascertain the optimal alloca-
tion of policies to different levels of government. This optimal allocation has
been discussed as resulting from a trade-off: on the one hand, the benefits
that centralization may bring in terms of internalizing externalities and re-
ducing production costs by means of economies of scale; on the other hand,
the welfare losses involved in centrally and uniformly providing goods to
large populations with heterogeneous preferences. For instance, Alesina et
al. have discussed the desirable allocation of policy responsibilities among
local, national, and the EU levels from this point of view.1
Political scientists have extensively studied how public opinion shapes
and constrains the process of European integration, and have offered a vari-
ety of, sometimes conflicting, theories to explain why citizens vary in their
support for European integration. Most scholars have explained preferences
over European integration in terms of its economic consequences, and have
suggested that lower-skilled workers are likely to have more negative evalu-
ations of European integration since they are thought to be less competitive
in an integrated market (see, for example, Scheve (2000)). While some re-
searchers, for instance, Hooghe and Marks (2004), have argued that national
identity is instead a key source of public opinion on European integration.
However, despite its undisputed importance, the issue of harmonization
of immigration policy is considerably under researched. To be best of our
knowledge, Luedtke (2005) is the only contribution. Based on Eurobarom-
eter survey data, the author empirically investigated the effect of national
identity on public opinion towards European Union control over immigra-
tion policy, and found that those who identify with their nation states are
less likely to support EU control over immigration policy than those iden-
tify with “Europe”. In this paper, we study on the same issue, that is EU
1See, for example, Alesina and Wacziarg (1999), and Alesina, Angeloni, and
Schuknecht (2005).
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citizens’ opinion towards delegating more powers to EU institutions over
immigration policy, from a labor market competition channel though.
Special attention has been devoted to recent research on the determinant
of public opinion towards immigration, several recent studies have high-
lighted the importance of labor-market mechanism in shaping individual
preferences. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find a strong relationship between
education and more favorable attitudes to further immigration, which is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that the low skilled are opposed to immigration
because of a fear of labor market competition predicted by the Heckscher-
Ohlin trade model and the factor-proportions analysis (FPA) model. Mayda
(2006), arguing within a similar theoretical setting, carries out a cross-
country analysis, finding evidence for a strong positive correlation between
individual skill level and pro-immigration attitudes in countries where im-
migration is relatively unskilled, i.e. the relative skill ratio of natives to
immigrants is high.
In the papers mentioned above, particular attention has been devoted
to the role played by education. The relationship on education and pro-
immigration attitudes is interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that at-
titudes are - at least in part - determined by economic self-interstest as
the FPA model suggests. Recent studies have questioned this interpreta-
tion. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), using European data, find that the
relationship between education and attitudes has very little, if anything,
to do with fears of labor market competition. In their view, education is
not a proxy for human capital, but instead captures a direct link to general
attitudes towards immigration. In particular, more educated individuals
support more cultural diversity, regardless of the immigrants’ skill level.
Another channel through which migration affects the well being of na-
tives is the welfare-state channel. The welfare-state channel is of particular
importance in Europe since the member countries are characterized by a
large welfare state, through which the public sector redistributes a substan-
tial fraction of national income across individuals. In this context, immi-
gration has a non-neligible impact on public finances, since foreign workers
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both contribute to and benefit from the welfare state. Facchini and Mayda
(2009), using the 1995 National Identity Module of the International Social
Survey Program (ISSP), show that in countries where natives are on aver-
age more skilled than immigrants, individual income is negatively correlated
with pro-immigration preferences, which is consistent with the welfare state
channel under the tax adjustment model.
In addition to these two economic determinants, there are also non-
economic channels through which opinions over immigration may be shaped.
Opposition to immigration may be motivated by reasons which relate to the
cultural and ethnic difference of the immigrant population. For instance,
the role of cultural drivers of attitudes has been explored by Dustmann
and Preston (2007), who find that racial and cultural prejudice are very
important drivers in the UK case. Gang et al. (2010) also find that culture
and racial prejudice are key factors influencing the attitudes of European
Union citizens towards foreigners. Along the same line, Katav-Herz (2010)
points out that social norms strongly affect a local population’s attitudes
towards immigration.
In summary, our study attempts to demonstrate a link between educa-
tion, as a proxy for human capital, and support for European integration in
the domain of immigration policy, while controlling for other factors. Such
a focus builds a bridge between the literature on public opinion and the
literature on immigration politics in the realm of European integration.
4.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we develop a simple model to answer two questions: 1)
what is the likely policy effect of harmonization on immigration policy -
that is, will a transfer of control to the EU lead to more immigrants? 2)
How will natives differing in their human capital endowment react to the
centralization of immigration policy?
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4.3.1 Centralization of immigration policy
We consider two symmetric countries, indexed by j ∈ {1, 2}. Each country
is populated by a continuum of citizens who are differ in their human cap-
ital endowments. We define immigration policy as the choice of the exact
number of foreign workers from the third country, Mj , to be admitted in
each destination country.
Following Benhabid (1995), we suppose each native i in country j sup-
plies one unit of “raw” labor and hi units of human capital, whereas for
simplicity migrants are assumed to supply only one unit of “raw” labor.
Thus, natives could be indexed by the units of human capital that they
own. The density of natives is given by the continuous density function
N(h), defined on [0, h¯]. Therefore, the population size of natives of economy
j, Nj , is given by
Nj =
∫ h¯
0
N(h) dh
and the total human capital stock of country j, Hj, is
Hj =
∫ h¯
0
N(h)hdh
We assume that in the receiving countries, a homogenous final good is
produced using two factors - “raw” labor and human capital. The aggregate
output is given by Y = F (H,L), where L = N +M , and F is an aggregate
production function exhibiting constant returns to scale. Per capita output
can be written as y ≡ Y/L = F (H/L, 1) ≡ f(h), where h = H/L is the after-
immigration average per capita human capital stock. For convenience, later
in this paper we will assume that the production function is a Cobb-Douglas
type, that is, Y = HαL1−α, with α ∈ (0, 1).
Under the assumptions of perfectly competitive factor markets and profit
maximization by the representative firm, input factors are paid their marginal
productivities:
ω =
∂Y
∂L
, and r =
∂Y
∂H
The receiving country j controls the access to its territory and can there-
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fore determine the number of foreign workers to be admitted, Mj ; similarly
the other country determines M−j . Let the vector M = (Mj ,M−j) summa-
rize the immigration policies implemented by the two countries.
Following Facchini, Lorz and Willmann (2006), we assume that though
the cost to country j is primarily determined by the number of foreign
workers it accepts (Mj), there are spill-overs of migrants. More specifically,
we assume that only a fraction, λ, of the immigrants admitted by country
j choose country j as their final destination, whereas the rest, (1 − λ), end
up moving to the other country. In this case, the total number of foreign
workers in country j is actually equal to [λMj + (1− λ)M−j ].
We now introduce costs of immigration.Although there are many direct
and indirect costs resulting from hosting migrants, in this paper we will
focus on one specific type of cost which is related to the integration of
migrants’ community into the receiving country. The so-called “congestion
effects”, as in Giordani and Ruta (2009), imply that it may become more and
more difficult to integrate larger community of foreigners in the destination
country. This would suggest that the costs of immigration are convex in the
number of migrants actually staying in the destination country.
More specifically, assume that the overall cost of immigration is de-
scribed by a twice continuously differentiable function C(M), with C ′(.) >
0, C ′′(.) > 0, C(0) = 0, C(M¯) = C¯. Consider the following cost function:3
Cj(M) =
[λMj + (1− λ)M−j ]
η
η(η − 1)
,with η > 2
We assume that the central planner in each receiving country does not
care about the welfare of foreign workers. In this setting, we can define the
net aggregate welfare in country j as the sum of factor payments to natives
net of immigration costs:
NΠj ≡ ωj(M)Nj + rj(M)Hj − Cj(M)
Under a non-cooperative framework, the social planner of each country
3The term η(η−1) at denominator is introduced just to simplify the calculations.
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maximizes net aggregate welfare by choosing the number of migrants allowed
to enter the country, taking the immigration policy of the counterpart as
given. The corresponding first order condition (FOC) is given by:
∂NΠj
∂Mj
=
∂ωj
∂Mj
Nj +
∂rj
∂Mj
Hj −
∂Cj
∂Mj
= 0
With Cobb-Douglas production function and the cost function assumed
earlier, after some algebra, the FOC above becomes
λα(1 − α)(
Hj
Lj
)α
[λMj + (1− λ)M−j ]
Lj
=
λ
η − 1
[λMj + (1− λ)M−j ]
η−1
where,
Lj = Nj + [λMj + (1− λ)M−j ]
We can show that, if the cost function is “sufficiently convex”, the welfare
function is everywhere strictly concave, which ensures that, if M∗j exists
which solves the FOC above, it is a global interior maximum. In fact,
∂2NΠj
∂M2j
< 0
⇔ η >
ln[α(1− α)Hαj L
α−1
j [(α− 1)
λMj+(1−λ)M−j
Lj
+ 1]]
ln[λMj + (1− λ)M−j ]
+ 2
Intuitively, the equilibrium policy is an interior solution if the congestion
effects of immigration in the destination country, as captured by the cost
elasticity η, are sufficiently strong.
Given the symmetry assumption, it is easy to show that Mj = M−j =
MN , where N stands for Nash equilibrium. The FOC could be further
simplified as
λα(1− α)(
Hj
Nj +MN
)α
MN
Nj +MN
=
λ
η − 1
(MN )η−1 (4.3.1)
Regarding the centralization of immigration policies, suppose there ex-
ists a supranational organization (like the EU) which aims at maximizing the
combined welfare of two receiving countries. More specifically, this suprana-
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tional institution maximizes a welfare function that the utility of all natives
in both countries equally weighted. In other words, it will be the solution
to the following problem:
maxW = NΠ1 +NΠ2
The corresponding FOC is given by:
∂W
∂Mj
=
∂ωj
∂Mj
Nj +
∂rj
∂Mj
Hj +
∂ω−j
∂Mj
N−j +
∂r−j
∂Mj
H−j −
∂Cj
∂Mj
= 0
Again, substituting the specific production function and costs function,
the FOC becomes:
λα(1−α)(
Hj
Lj
)α
[λMj + (1− λ)M−j ]
Lj
+(1−λ)α(1−α)(
H−j
L−j
)α
[(1− λ)Mj + λM−j ]
L−j
=
λ
η − 1
[λMj + (1− λ)M−j ]
η−1
Taken together, the first-order conditions for the two countries imply
that the number of foreign workers admitted into each country is the same,
i.e., Mj = M−j = M
U . Due to the symmetry (Hj = H−j, Nj = N−j), this
common number satisfies the following condition:
α(1− α)(
Hj
Nj +MU
)α
MU
Nj +MU
=
λ
η − 1
(MU )η−1 (4.3.2)
The effect of cooperation in immigration policies, which is captured by
the change in the number of foreign workers admitted in country j, can be
shown by comparing MN and MU which are solutions to equation (4.3.1)
and (4.3.2) respectively.
Taking logs on both sides of equations (4.3.1) and (4.3.2), we obtain the
following equations after some rearrangement:
(1 + α) ln(Nj +M
N ) + (η − 2) lnMN = A
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and,
(1 + α) ln(Nj +M
U ) + (η − 2) lnMU = A− lnλ
where, A ≡ lnα+ ln(1− α) + ln(η − 1) + α lnHj.
According to the assumption we have made (0 < λ < 1) and properties
of log function, we can easily show that
(1+α) ln(Nj +M
U )+ (η− 2) lnMU > (1+α) ln(Nj +M
N )+ (η− 2) lnMN
And due to the assumption η > 2, it could be easily proved that
MU > MN
which means that the optimal number of migrants who are accepted will be
larger if receiving countries cooperate with each other in terms of immigra-
tion policies.
Intuitively, the social planners of receiving countries separately choose
an optimal number of immigrants who are allowed to enter the country as
to maximize the net aggregate welfare, given a “sufficiently convex” cost
function of immigration. It turns out, the number of immigrants accepted
in the non-cooperative equilibrium is suboptimally low due to the spillovers
of migrants admitted by the counterpart. When the receiving countries hand
over immigration control to a supranational organization, like the EU, the
spillovers are internalized and therefore the optimal number maximizing the
combined welfare is larger than the Nash equilibrium.
4.3.2 Individual attitudes towards centralization
Recall that we assume that each native i in destination j supplies one unit
of “raw” labor and hi units of human capital. The earnings of native i
can therefore be written as (j is omitted since two receiving countries are
identical):
Ii = f(h)− hf
′(h) + hif
′(h) = f(h) + (hi − h)f
′(h)
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Individuals use their income to purchase the final good and have a linear
utility function in consumption.
When confronted with a proposal of Europeanization of immigration
policies, a citizen of country j will compare the status quo (which will be
indicated with superscript 0) with the hypothetical situation that would
arise if the initiative were accepted (superscript 1). Under the assumption
of unskilled immigration, centralization of immigration policies will decrease
the average human capital in receiving countries, that is h1 < h0.
In terms of a native’s earnings, the difference between the two situations
can be written as follows:
∆Ii = I
1
i − I
0
i = [f(h
1)− h1f ′(h1)]− [f(h0)− h0f ′(h0)] + hi[f
′(h1)− f ′(h0)]
or in a more compact form,
∆Ii = (ω
1 − ω0) + (r1 − r0)hi
In this case, the difference of income for a native i, ∆Ii, consists of two
terms: the first is the reduction in wage income of one unit “raw” labor;
and the second is the increase in human capital returns, which is linear in
her endowment of human capital.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, the difference in wage
income is negative,
ω1 − ω0 = (1− α)[(h1)α − (h0)α] < 0
and, the change in returns on human capital is positive,
r1 − r0 = α[(h1)α−1 − (h0)α−1] > 0
If we plot the difference in income, ∆Ii, against individual’s human cap-
ital endowment, hi, as in Figure 4.1, we will see a strictly-upward straight
line which crosses the x-axis once and only once. This implies that there
exists at least one native, with human capital h∗, whose loss in wage in-
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come of “raw labor” is completely compensated by the benefit resulting
from the increase in human capital return. In this case, the marginal na-
tive is indifferent between the status quo and the hypothetical situation (i.e.
Europeanization of immigration policy). Since the difference in individual’s
total income is increasing with human capital endowment, those individuals
whose human capital stock exceed the marginal level, h∗, will benefit from
the centralization of immigration policies; while the others are likely to lose.
We assume the marginal natives will support the initiative, and define a
dummy variable where a person is given a value of 1 if they are in favor of the
initiative and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the attitudes of natives in destination
countries could be described as follows:
procomimmi =


0 if hi < h
∗
1 if hi ≥ h
∗
(4.3.3)
In summary, the expected change in income from the centralized immi-
gration policy is a linear function of an individual’s human capital endow-
ment. All individuals with human capital stock below the marginal level h∗,
have a lower income under the hypothetical situation, and thus vote against
the initiative. For those individuals with human capital stock above the
marginal level, the higher is the human capital endowment, the greater is
the benefits he will obtain, and thus the higher is the probability he will
support the initiative.
4.4 Data and Summary Statistics
We draw on several waves of Eurobarometer surveys for the period 2000 -
2008 (Eurobarometer 54.1, 56.2, 58.1, 59.1, 62.0, 64.2, 66.1, 67.2, and 69.2)
to empirically investigate citizens’ attitudes towards transferring compete-
ces from a national government to the EU institutions in the domain of
immigration policy.
The Eurobarometer survey series was introduced by the European Com-
mission in 1973 and since then surveys have been held twice a year in all
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member countries. The Standard Eurobarometer polls ask for attitudes
towards European unification, institutions and policies, complemented by
measurements for general socio-political orientations, as well as for respon-
dent and household demographics. Standard Eurobarometer samples were
initially drawn among the national population, aged 15 and over, and its
regular sample size is approximately 1000 respondents per country, except
for small countries like Luxembourg or Malta. Starting with Eurobarome-
ter 32 (October 1989) the basic sampling design in all member states is a
multi-stage, probability one, and a post-stratification weighting procedure
is employed in each of the participating countries. It is noteworthy that
for each Standard Eurobarometer survey new and independent samples are
drawn; and therefore, our data set enjoys a pooled cross-sectional structure.2
To construct a measure of supporting Europeanization of immigration
policies, we use respondents’ answers in the EB survey to the questions
about whether they prefer political decisions in selected policy areas at the
“EU-level” or “national level”. The specific wording of the question is as
follow:
“For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions
should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made
jointly within the European Union?”
The survey format also allows for “don’t know (DK)” responses, which
we treat as missing values and thus exclude from the sample in our spec-
ifications. As we can see in Figure 4.1, which displays the percentage of
individuals who are in favor of delegating authority to the EU in the field
of migration policy, the fraction of “DK” is small enough to be ignored
and does not vary substantially across countries. Based on answers to this
question, we construct our dependent variable, procomimmi dummy, which
is dichotomous variable equals 1 for respondents who prefer “jointly within
the EU” and 0 otherwise.
Empirical labor economists commonly measure human capital or skills
via educational attainment or occupation classification. In this study we
2For more information about Eurobarometer, please refer to the official website.
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employ years of education as the key independent variable to test the labor
market predictions of the model. More specifically, we use answers to the
question - “How old are you when you stopped full-time education?”. We
trim the data to the range of (6, 32), implying a range of 0 to 26 years of
education.
In the robustness check, we also examine whether or not the image of
EU plays an independent role in citizens’ feelings towards immigration policy
harmonization. In Eurobaromter surveys, there are a series of questions ask-
ing respondents’ perception on their country’s membership of the EU, such
as “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership
of the European Union is...”. Opinions from respodents’ are measured on a
scale from 1 = a bad thing and 3 = a good thing.
We also constructed a dichotomous variables, TRUSTEU, based on an-
swers to these questions - “For each of the following European bodies, please
tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?”. More specifically, we
selected four most important European bodies, that is the European Parlia-
ment, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers of the European
Union, and the European Central Bank. The dummy variable, TRUSTEU,
equals one if respondents trust at least three of them and zero otherwise.
The Eurobarometer data includes also information on a number of individual-
level characteristics defining the socio-economic background of each respon-
dents, for example, the age, gender, political affiliation and religion. We take
into account the self-reported right partisan political orientation of each re-
spondent (measured on a scale from 1=left to 10=right), to capture the effect
of political affiliation on natives’ attitudes towards a common immigration
policy.
Finally, it is worth noting that the sample is restricted to native respon-
dents in each country, since we are interested in attitudes of natives towards
centralization of immigration policies. Respondents who did not answer
questions as to their nationality, age or sex are also removed from the sam-
ple. The remaining sample of citizens of the European Union included in
our sample is 103,221.
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The summary statistics of the dependent variable, procomimmi dummy,
and all the other control variables used in empirical analysis are presented
in Table 4.1. As shown in Table 4.1, for the remaining sample, the average
age when stopping full-time education is 18, i.e. on average our respondents
have completed 12 years of education. Regarding EU citizens’ support to
European integration in general, nearly 60 percent of EU citizens show their
preferences over common policies decided by the EU institutions.
For the whole sample, on average support for integration is only marginally
higher than opposition on it (the arithmetic mean of procomimmi dummy is
0.55 in Table 4.1). But this figure hides a high degree of heterogeneity from
country to country, which can be clearly seen in Figure 4.2. Less than half
of the EU-15 countries support the harmonization of immigration policies,
and clearly those new destination countries such as Italy and Spain appar-
ently show greater support to this propose. Italy and Finland stands for two
extreme cases, where in Italy, nearly 70% of the natives prefer to grant more
power to the EU institutions, whereas only 20% citizens in Finland support
Europeanization of immigration policy. On the other hand, centralization
of immigration policies is widely welcomed in new member states (NMS),
which can be seen in Figure 4.3. Except in Estonia, the fraction of citizens
who support a common immigration policy is as high as 60 percent in all
the other countries. In particular, more than 70 percent of the natives in
Malta show preferences for granting competences to the EU institutions.
In addition, we examine the trends of support for centralization of immi-
gration policies over time in each member country. Overall, most countries
show a slight increase of support for the centralization of immigration policy,
with the exception of Greece. The support for delegating EU-decided immi-
gration policy in Greece peaked around year 2001, and kept declining after
that. Interestingly, the fraction of natives showing preference over a com-
mon immigration policy in Germany West has been increasing since 2000,
which is contrary to the deep impression that Germany have been insist-
ing on a “national veto” on the numbers of immigrants admitted. Another
surprising result is that we do not find any evident discontinuing jump in
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year 2004, when 10 new member states joined the EU. In those new member
states, although the propose of a EU immigration policy is widely supported,
there are quite large fluctuations over time in some countries, for instance,
in Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia.
4.5 Benchmark Regression
To assess more systematically the determinants of individuals’ preferences
over delegating competences to EU on immigration, we estimate a simple
probit model. The probability of supporting Europeanization of immigra-
tion policy serves as the dependent variables, and education levels and other
demographic characteristics are included as explanatory variables. We also
include destination countries’ fixed effects, to account for the impact of
unobserved country-specific effects, and year fixed effects, to account for
common year specific shocks. In all specifications we use robust standard
errors clustered by country, to address heteroskedasticity and allow for cor-
relation across individual observations within the same country. Specifically,
we estimate the following probit model:
Prob(procomimmiict = 1|xict) = Φ(α+βeduict+γXict+cj+yt+ǫijt) (4.5.1)
where Φ represents the cumulative distribution function of a standard nor-
mal, β is the parameter of interest, capturing the effect of education on
preferences over harmonization of immigration policies. Xict is the vector
of all other control variables specific to individual i who is from country c,
and γ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
The overall analysis estimates the degree to which education and other
explanatory variables have an effect on the probability that an EU resident
will support a Brussels-controlled immigration policy, all other things being
equal. Table 4.3 displays results of our initial set of regressions where we
assume a common coefficient on individual-level variables across countries,
based on the sub-sample of EU-15. The results are generally consistent with
the theoretical predictions and in accordance with former results presented
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in the literature.
In column (1) of Table 4.3, we present results of the most basic regression
only with years of education, age and female as control variables. Ceteris
paribus, in the EU-15 respondents’ age is negatively associated with the
probability of supporting centralization of immigration policy. Although
not statistically significant, females are less likely to favor immigration pol-
icy integration, which is consistent with predictions since women respon-
dents tend to have lower skill levels than men, on average, in the European
economies.
The relationship we are interested in is the one between education and
the individual attitudes towards Europeanization of immigration policy. The
estimated coefficient on education indicates that higher educational attain-
ments are associated with a statistically significant increase in the probabil-
ity of displaying positive attitudes towards granting more power to the EU,
with everything else held constant. More specifically, a one unit increase
in the (number of) years of education, increases the likelihood that an in-
dividual favors immigration policy integration by 3 percentage points, after
controlling country and year fixed effects.
In column (2) of Table 4.3, we repeat regression with an additional pre-
dictor, i.e. the self-reported left-right placement. The far-right parties in
Europe have typically been the most vocal opponents of immigration, thus
belonging politically to the Right leads to a preference for the nation-state
to control immigration, while those on the Left will be more likely to sup-
port the harmonization of immigration policy. The regression result shows
that people who are more politically conservative are indeed more likely to
oppose the centralization of immigration policies in general. More precisely,
one unit shift to the right on the left-right ideological dimension is associated
with a 2.3 percentage points reduction in the likelihood that a respondent
is would like to give up national control over immigration.
Results of regression with type of community included is reported in
column (3) of Table 4.3. We take into account the region of residence be-
cause the previous literature has shown that individuals in rural are more
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conservative and thus more likely to support restrictive immigration policies
that those in urban and suburban communities. As in line with previous
literatures, our regression result shows that individuals living in a middle or
large town are more likely to favor immigration policy integration compared
to those living in rural or a small town (i.e. the reference group). However,
the effects are not statistically significant.
Furthermore, we augment our basic specification by adding two more
regressors to test if individuals’ attitudes towards Europeanization of immi-
gration policies is related with their general perception on EU integration.
The regression results are reported at the last column of Table 4.3. As it
turns out, the point estimates on these two newly-added control variables
are positive and significant at 0.1% confidence level. The probability of
supporting the harmonization of immigration policy is higher for those EU
citizens who believe that their country’s membership of the EU is “a good
thing” and for those who in general show higher trust to the EU institutions.
When controlling additional predictors, the estimated coefficient on ed-
ucation become smaller in magnitude, however it remains statistically sig-
nificant in all the regressions. These evidences confirm our hypothesis that
education, as a proxy for human capital, plays an essential role in shaping
individuals attitudes towards an EU immigration policy.
To summarize, for the sub-sample of EU-15 countries, the regression
results are quite supportive of the labor-market competition predictions,
and in line with results from previous literature. In particular, our initial
results reveal that, on average, in the sample of countries considered, there
exists a positive and statistically significant correlation between individuals’
skill, measured as years of education, and their preferences over assigning
more powers to the EU institutions in the immigration policy area.
4.6 Robustness Checks
We first check the robustness of our results by adding the ten new member
states who joined in EU in year 2004 into our sample. Many researchers
have found that the timing of entry, the length of EU membership, and
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national economic conditions are important determinants of support in favor
of European integration. Therefore, we re-run the regressions, based on the
whole sample, to check whether or not there also exist a strong positive
correlation between natives’ education level and their support to an EU
immigration policy among new member states. It is worthy noting that the
data for NMS-10 are only available starting in 2004.
The regression results are reported in Table 4.4. As we can see, though
still significant, the point estimates of education is smaller in the absolute
value, and even smaller when we controlling for respondents’ general percep-
tion of the EU in the last column of Table 4.4. These results indicate that in
those new member states, the link between years of education and support-
ing a common immigration policy is not as strong as in the EU-15 member
states. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that natives in new
member states are relatively low-skilled compared to natives in more eco-
nomically advanced EU-15 member countries. The large share of unskilled
natives in new members states are more likely to oppose the Europeaniza-
tion of immigration policy if they correctly realize that an EU immigration
policy is likely to increase the inflows of unskilled foreign workers.
The negative relationship between respondents’ age and probability of
supporting immigration policy integration becomes stronger when it comes
to the new member states. Other socio-demograohic characteristics, such as
gender and type of residence, seem not to play a systematic role across new
member countries neither, since point estimates are found to vary in sign as
well as in significance.
The same patter as before has been observed regarding the relationship
between political orientation and the support to an EU immigration policy.
The results in Table 4.4 show that the more rightist the position of a native
on the left-right ideological dimension, the more likely it is that he will vote
against handing over immigration control to the the EU organizations. We
also find evidence that natives’ general perception of the EU continues to
play an important role in determining their attitudes towards an centralized
immigration policy. People who believes that their country benefited from
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the EU membership and trust the EU institutions are more likely to support
granting more power to the EU organization in the filed of immigration.
So far, we assume that the coefficients on individual-level control vari-
ables are the same across the countries. In fact, EU member countries vary
widely in various aspects, such as the labor market and immigration sit-
uation, therefore one might not expect the education level to be equally
salient in all EU member states as far as national control over immigra-
tion policy is concerned. To understand this cross-national variation in a
comparative sense, we now turn to a 15-nation comparative model that will
test the impact of explanatory variables on the likelihood of supporting the
Europeanization of immigration policy, in each of the EU member states as
a separate sample.
The probit regression coefficients for the control variables, in each coun-
try as a separate sample, are displayed in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 for EU-15
member states. As is clear from these two tables, it appears that years of
education is a relatively stable and consistent predictor of feelings towards
EU immigration policy across most EU-15 member states. The most dra-
matic results are in Belgium, Denmark and UK, where a one unit increase
in the years of education leads to a above 3-point percent increase in the
odds of preferring immigration decisions to be made jointly within EU. On
the other hand, the results show there is no significant impact of education
on such preferences in Luxembourg and Portugal.
However, education is not the only significant predictor of opinion about
immigration policy harmonization in the EU, as the tables reflect. There are
other factors that are driving the attitudes towards a Brussels-controlled im-
migration policy. The point coefficients on EUMEMBERSHIP and TRUSTEU
are also positive and statistically significant in all the probit regressions, in-
dicating that citizens’ overall opinion about the EU also plays an important
role in shaping their attitudes towards the centralization of immigration
policy.
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4.7 Conclusions
Immigration policy is a very controversial topic which poses a challenge for
the EU and the member states, a thorough analysis is very important to
understand the development that have happened so far and meanwhile to
be able to successfully predict possible changes in the future. A “race-to-the
top” phenomenon in restrictive immigration policies has been observed re-
cently in Europe because of lack of cooperation among destination countries
and cooperation between receiving and sending countries. A supranational-
ized common EU immigration policy, though considered as an effective way
to rectify this problem, has not formulated yet.
In this paper, we have developed a simple theoretical framework to study
the impact of skills, measured as years of education, on individuals’ atti-
tudes towards establishing a harmonized immigration policy. In particular,
we have shown that delegating competences to the EU in the field of im-
migration is likely to lead to a more liberal policy for unskilled immigrants.
Unskilled natives in destination countries thus prefer national control over
immigration policy because they are fear of competition brought by a larger
inflows of unskilled foreign workers. In other words, EU citizens’ education
level are positively correlated with their support to the harmonization of
immigration policy.
Using various waves of Eurobarometer surveys, we have brought the pre-
dictions of the model to the data. The regression results of simple probit
models are consistent with the labor-market competition model, showing
that there is a strong positive relationship between individuals’ education
levels and their attitudes on this issue. The results remain robustness even
when we controlling for some additional explanatory variables. In addition,
it appears that years of education is a relatively stable and consistent predic-
tor of feelings towards EU immigration policy across most EU-15 member
states, when it comes to cross-country variations in preferences.
Nevertheless, our analysis are of great interest given the importance of
the immigration issue throughout Europe, and provides some grounds for
building a common immigration policy. While contributing to a better un-
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derstanding of the roots of different public opinions on common immigration
policy, the results also have immediate implications for policy makers if they
are to ensure that a common immigration policy received widespread accep-
tance. Economic considerations contribute to opinions on migration issues,
thus policies related to labor market security and welfare spending may have
important effects on public resistance towards further immigration. Further-
more, education policies are clearly necessary, from both an economic and
non-economic points of review. Promoting knowledge of EU institutions and
a culture of tolerance can be very effective in shaping attitudes towards EU
integration, especially in the domain of immigration policy.
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between human capital and changes in income
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Figure 4.2: Fraction of favoring an EU immigration policy over 2000-08
(EU-15)
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Figure 4.3: Fraction of favoring an EU immigration policy over 2004-08
(NMS-10)
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Figure 4.4: Individuals’ attitudes to an EU immigration policy over time
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
France Belgium The Netherlands Germany West Italy Luxembourg
Denmark Ireland Great Britain Northern Ireland Greece Spain
Portugal Germany East Finland Sweden Austria Cyprus (Republic)
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta
Poland Slovakia Slovenia
a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f p
ro
co
m
im
m
i d
um
m
y
year
Graphs by NATION − ALL SAMPLES
99
REFERENCES
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of individual-level variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
year 2004.507 2.493 2000 2008 123636
country 12.454 7.893 1 28 123636
comimmi 1.534 0.499 1 2 123636
procomimmi 0.534 0.499 0 1 123636
edu 18.374 4.1 6 32 123636
age 49.365 16.548 0 99 123636
community 1.91 0.787 1 3 113587
female 0.521 0.5 0 1 123636
lrwing 5.344 2.103 1 10 123636
membership 1.568 0.722 1 3 123636
trustparliament 1.517 0.704 1 3 123636
trustcommission 1.602 0.752 1 3 123636
trustcouncil 1.732 0.809 1 3 123636
trustECB 1.633 0.795 1 3 123636
trustEU 0.48 0.5 0 1 123636
crime 1.708 0.47 1 3 123636
comdefence 1.605 0.522 1 3 123636
environment 1.671 0.487 1 3 123636
regionsupport 1.701 0.5 1 3 123636
procentral 0.585 0.493 0 1 123636
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of individual-level variables by country (mean
values)
Country Procomimmi Edu Age lrwing trustEU
France 0.65 18.67 47.98 4.96 0.43
Belgium 0.65 18.75 48.88 5.16 0.55
The Netherlands 0.60 19.46 49.30 5.18 0.45
Germany West 0.54 18.03 50.70 5.28 0.39
Italy 0.73 17.95 46.67 5.14 0.57
Luxembourg 0.47 18.81 50.71 5.37 0.58
Denmark 0.38 21.89 50.58 5.70 0.45
Ireland 0.48 17.73 46.88 5.64 0.58
Great Britain 0.33 17.05 50.11 5.22 0.19
Northern Ireland 0.45 17.10 48.80 5.36 0.29
Greece 0.58 16.92 49.57 5.68 0.58
Spain 0.70 16.51 46.88 4.61 0.58
Portugal 0.57 14.36 48.45 5.14 0.60
Germany East 0.47 18.01 49.87 4.66 0.37
Finland 0.20 20.02 52.33 5.68 0.46
Sweden 0.35 20.36 51.30 5.41 0.38
Austria 0.36 17.83 46.78 5.19 0.40
Cyprus (Republic 0.67 16.86 51.72 5.33 0.63
Czech Republic 0.62 18.74 48.47 5.70 0.48
Estonia 0.43 19.44 51.43 5.97 0.57
Hungary 0.64 17.11 51.43 5.52 0.57
Latvia 0.68 18.87 47.33 6.13 0.40
Lithuania 0.72 19.02 50.86 5.48 0.58
Malta 0.75 16.65 50.75 5.71 0.59
Poland 0.73 19.06 49.04 5.89 0.49
Slovakia 0.64 18.66 48.51 5.08 0.56
Slovenia 0.67 18.97 51.56 5.38 0.63
Total 0.53 18.37 49.37 5.34 0.48
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Attitudes towards an EU Immigration Policy
(EU-15)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EDUCATION 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗
(26.86) (26.86) (25.92) (16.56)
AGE -0.00101∗∗∗ -0.000796∗∗ -0.000748∗∗ -0.000747∗∗
(-3.80) (-2.97) (-2.64) (-2.60)
FEMALE -0.0157 -0.0185∗ -0.0165 0.0113
(-1.86) (-2.19) (-1.85) (1.24)
L/R PLACEMENT -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.0223∗∗∗ -0.0275∗∗∗
(-10.87) (-9.79) (-11.90)
MIDDLE TOWN 0.0141 0.00670
(1.31) (0.62)
LARGE TOWN 0.00311 -0.0107
(0.27) (-0.91)
EU MEMBERSHIP 0.322∗∗∗
(46.66)
TRUSTEU 0.171∗∗∗
(17.46)
Observations 94700 94700 84651 84651
Country / Year FEs yes yes yes yes
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable, procomimmi dummy, equals one if respondents prefer the immigration policy to be
determined jointly within the EU and zero otherwise.
For definitions of control variables, please see section IV.
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Table 4.4: Determinants of Attitudes towards Common Immigration Policy
(EU15 + NMS10)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EDUCATION 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗
(26.59) (26.62) (25.65) (15.89)
AGE -0.00153∗∗∗ -0.00145∗∗∗ -0.00146∗∗∗ -0.00147∗∗∗
(-6.54) (-6.19) (-6.00) (-5.97)
FEMALE -0.00859 -0.0100 -0.00762 0.0161∗
(-1.16) (-1.35) (-0.99) (2.05)
L/R PLACEMENT -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0191∗∗∗
(-7.47) (-6.41) (-10.17)
MIDDLE TOWN 0.00286 -0.00792
(0.31) (-0.85)
LARGE TOWN -0.00347 -0.0230∗
(-0.34) (-2.26)
EU MEMBERSHIP 0.295∗∗∗
(48.93)
TRUSTEU 0.175∗∗∗
(20.76)
Observations 123636 123636 113587 113587
Country / Year FEs yes yes yes yes
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable, procomimmi dummy, equals one if respondents prefer the immigration policy to be
determined jointly within the EU and zero otherwise.
For definitions of control variables, please see section IV.
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Table 4.5: Determinants of attitudes to common immi policy in each country (EU-15)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FR BE NL DE IT LU DK
EDUCATION 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗ 0.0130 0.0354∗∗∗
(5.40) (6.04) (4.96) (4.92) (2.97) (1.69) (8.62)
AGE 0.000678 0.00235∗ 0.00108 0.00141 0.00221 0.000455 -0.000613
(0.61) (2.05) (0.98) (1.83) (1.47) (0.26) (-0.57)
FEMALE -0.0476 -0.0395 -0.0144 0.0768∗∗ -0.0143 0.0624 -0.0248
(-1.37) (-1.12) (-0.45) (2.99) (-0.34) (1.16) (-0.70)
L/R PLACEMENT -0.0466∗∗∗ -0.0267∗∗ -0.0275∗∗ -0.0314∗∗∗ -0.0301∗∗∗ -0.0676∗∗∗ -0.0543∗∗∗
(-5.41) (-2.88) (-3.25) (-4.26) (-3.66) (-4.75) (-6.08)
MIDDLE TOWN -0.0199 -0.0690 -0.0408 0.0171 -0.0845 0.0200 0.0502
(-0.50) (-1.72) (-1.12) (0.55) (-1.50) (0.35) (1.15)
LARGE TOWN -0.0370 -0.00547 0.00782 0.0168 -0.130 0.0554 0.124∗∗
(-0.76) (-0.11) (0.18) (0.49) (-1.96) (0.59) (2.62)
EU MEMBERSHIP 0.345∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(13.87) (9.30) (12.34) (14.40) (7.28) (4.51) (15.06)
TRUSTEU 0.172∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.0531 0.193∗∗∗
(4.62) (4.70) (3.92) (5.26) (3.64) (0.94) (5.10)
Observations 5897 5592 6728 10105 4500 2298 5716
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Year fixed effects are included in all the regressions.
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Table 4.6: Determinants of attitudes to common immi policy in each country (EU-15) continue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IE UK EL ES PT FI SE AT
EDUCATION 0.0126 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗ 0.0157∗∗ 0.00621 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0217∗∗∗
(1.80) (5.58) (3.18) (2.91) (1.27) (4.47) (5.91) (3.51)
AGE -0.00212 -0.00548∗∗∗ 0.000828 -0.00145 -0.00420∗∗∗ -0.00376∗∗ 0.000847 -0.00378∗∗
(-1.75) (-5.84) (0.68) (-1.11) (-3.33) (-3.08) (0.77) (-3.15)
FEMALE -0.0670 0.140∗∗∗ -0.0342 -0.00610 0.0618 0.139∗∗∗ -0.0777∗ -0.00104
(-1.84) (4.35) (-0.92) (-0.16) (1.63) (3.57) (-2.17) (-0.03)
L/R PLACEMENT 0.00236 -0.0659∗∗∗ 0.00339 -0.0244∗ 0.0138 -0.0490∗∗∗ 0.00369 -0.0175
(0.23) (-6.94) (0.42) (-2.39) (1.44) (-4.87) (0.42) (-1.82)
MIDDLE TOWN 0.0295 0.0447 -0.0151 -0.0807 0.00214 0.125∗∗ 0.0631 -0.0542
(0.56) (1.09) (-0.27) (-1.72) (0.05) (2.74) (1.52) (-1.19)
LARGE TOWN -0.0790 0.0120 0.0689 -0.189∗∗∗ -0.00190 0.0588 0.0824 -0.0234
(-1.94) (0.29) (1.62) (-3.88) (-0.04) (1.03) (1.71) (-0.53)
EU MEMBERSHIP 0.248∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(7.08) (20.24) (10.31) (6.95) (5.71) (10.20) (15.67) (12.50)
TRUSTEU 0.214∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(5.54) (6.14) (7.60) (4.74) (4.67) (3.20) (3.54) (5.24)
Observations 4924 7088 5167 4845 4802 5862 5789 5338
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Year fixed effects are included in all the regressions.
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